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THE HYDRAULICS OF INTERMEDIARY
LIABILITY REGULATION
BEN HORTON*
ABSTRACT
The intermediary immunity created by Section 230 probably protects claims based
on the non-legal harms of hate speech and misinformation as well as a European-style
proportionality system of content moderation better than a more “legalized”
intermediary liability regime would. Contrasting the existing non-copyright content
moderation systems with empirical research on the effects of the DMCA shows that a
comprehensive regulation of content moderation would incentivize the moderation of
defamation and negligence claims at the expense of these important non-legal claims
and incentivize a homogenous, categorical approach to content moderation.
Furthermore, empirical research on the effects of SESTA-FOSTA and online
secondary copyright liability outside the DMCA’s safe harbor shows the effects of a
non-comprehensive solution would be even worse: incentivizing widespread
automation and crude blocking with negligible positive effects. Instead, policymakers
should focus on narrow changes to Section 230, remedies that punish systemic
violations, and non-tort solutions.
CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 202

II.

FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................. 205
A. Section 230 and Terminology ................................................................ 205
B. Classic Theory of Intermediary Liability Immunity ............................... 210
1.

Pro Intermediary Immunity ............................................................ 210

2.

Critics of Intermediary Liability Immunity .................................... 214

C. Speech, Personhood, and Process Claims—And Their Limits .............. 215

* Ben Horton is a lawyer working on issues of election law, corporate accountability, and free
speech.
Thanks to Rebecca Tushnet for providing copious feedback and suggestions, and to Frankie
Collantes and Aaron Dunn for helping to workshop earlier versions of the piece. All errors my
own.

201

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

1

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

202

III.

[70:201

1.

Defining Speech and Personhood Claims ...................................... 215

2.

Speech and Personhood Claims and Intermediary Liability ........... 222

3.

Process Claims ............................................................................... 223

4.

Beyond the Rights Framework ....................................................... 225

APPLICATION TO SECTION 230 ...................................................................... 227
A. Speech, Personhood, and Process Claims ............................................. 228
B. Section 230 and Content Moderation Beyond Rights ............................ 235

IV.

LEGALIZING CONTENT MODERATION ............................................................ 237
A. DMCA: A Flawed, Comprehensive System ........................................... 237
1.

Comprehensive Systems................................................................. 238

2.

Speech, Personhood, and Process Claims under the DMCA .......... 240

3.

The Limits of Reform ..................................................................... 245

4.

The DMCA Beyond Rights ............................................................ 248

B. SESTA-FOSTA and Secondary Copyright Liability: Common Law
Confusion .............................................................................................. 250
1.

The Law of SESTA-FOSTA .......................................................... 250

2.

The Law of Online Secondary Copyright Liability ........................ 252

3.

The Effects of SESTA-FOSTA and Online Secondary Copyright
Liability on Rights .......................................................................... 253

4.

The Effects of SESTA-FOSTA and Online Secondary Copyright
Liability Beyond Rights ................................................................. 256

C. The Elephant in the Room: The Rest of the World ................................ 258

V.

1.

The Common Law Approach ......................................................... 259

2.

The Effects of the Common Law Approach ................................... 261

SUGGESTIONS ................................................................................................ 263
A. Systemic Compliance ............................................................................. 263
B. Narrow Confusion ................................................................................. 266

VI.

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 269

I. INTRODUCTION
Reforms to Section 230, which gives broad civil immunity to most hosts of online
content, increasingly like fusion energy, except instead of always being thirty years
away, it is always a few months away. While the President and the Senate Minority
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Leader have both called for the law’s repeal,1 and the House Majority Leader has said
it should be “revised,”2 the Senate Majority Leader complained that:3
I mean, the internet, so much happens and there’s so much information that
worries people too. I don’t know the exact solution. I’ve asked many people,
everyone wants to change Section 230, but no one has given me a good
answer for how to change 230.
Calling himself an “economic fundamentalist,” Senator Schumer indicated he felt
more comfortable fixing the economy and thought that spending had a better shot of
winning over Independents and moderate Republicans than internet regulations.4 But
in a gridlocked Congress, bipartisan issues are hard to come by, and even though no
one agrees on what should replace Section 230 (or any other tech issue, for that
matter),5 they might agree to repeal it or agree to some reform so nebulous that both
sides can believe they are getting what they want.6
If that happens, it is not clear what will replace it and what the internet will look
like afterward. Reforms have usually taken the form of awarding immunity only if
certain conditions are met,7 creating a carve-out for immunity in some favored area of
1 See, e.g., Makena Kelly, McConnell Ties Full Repeal of Section 230 to Push for $2,000
Stimulus
Checks,
THE
VERGE
(Dec.
29,
2020),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/12/29/22204976/section-230-senate-deal-stimulus-talkschecks; N.Y. Times Ed. Bd., Joe Biden, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html
(in an interview with the New York Times editorial board, then-nominee Joe Biden said
“Section 230 should be revoked, immediately should be revoked, number one.”).
2 Ryan Lovelace, Pelosi Says Law Protecting Social Media Companies from Liability ‘Needs
to
be
Revised,’
Not
Repealed,
WASH.
TIMES
(Dec.
10,
2020),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/dec/10/section-230-provision-protectingsocial-media-need/.
3 Ezra Klein, Transcript: Ezra Klein Interviews Chuck Schumer, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/30/podcasts/ezra-klein-podcast-chuck-schumertranscript.html.
4 Id.
5 See generally Mark Lemley, The Contradictions of Platform Regulation, 1 J. OF FREE
SPEECH L. 303 (2021) (arguing that a widespread urge to “regulate” technology masks deep
divides that will make it difficult for Congress to actually reform § 230—or, indeed, enact any
meaningful reform).
6 Eric Goldman, Comments on the “Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency
Act” (the “PACT Act”), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 27, 2020),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/07/comments-on-the-platform-accountability-andconsumer-transparency-act-the-pact-act.htm (responding to an earlier draft of the bill, though it
is still applicable to the more recent one: “rather than proposing a narrow and targeted solution
to a well-identified problem, the drafters packaged this jumble of ideas together to create a
broad and wide-ranging omnibus reform proposal.”).
7 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying
Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017) (conditioning immunity on
“reasonable” efforts to take down unlawful content); Emma Llansó, Amendment’s to EARN IT
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law,8 or trying to change the “material contribution standard,” which determines
which platforms receive Section 230 immunity.9 Reformers are often motivated by
the perceived lack of action on the part of online intermediaries, especially big ones,
but there is often a gap between their stated goals and the tools they are using.10
Upending a law that has been essential to the structure of the internet without
developing a robust alternative is, to put it mildly, problematic.
First, I briefly review the legal system Section 230 creates. Then, I develop a
framework for evaluating the effects of intermediary liability systems on rights claims,
both speech and non-speech, and process claims. Disentangling those categories is
especially important to ensure policymakers are using the right tools for the right
problems. However, I also discuss the limits of thinking about content moderation in
a rights-based framework, even a broad one. Essentially, it forces discussions into an
adjudicatory framework that misses how content moderation systems actually work.
With a broader rights-based framework and an acknowledgment of its limitations, we
can see how Section 230 should not be seen as a tool of Free Speech absolutists.11
Instead, it has allowed political currents that were shut down by the United States’
exceptional First Amendment jurisprudence to be rechanneled in the form of powerful
market and cultural incentives that act upon online intermediaries. This becomes
especially clear when compared to the systems that have resulted from two other
models: the relatively comprehensive model under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (“DMCA”) and the “common law confusion” models created by the Allow States

Act Can’t Fix the Bill’s Fundamental Flaws, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH. BLOG (July 1,
2020), https://cdt.org/insights/amendments-to-earn-it-act-cant-fix-the-bills-fundamental-flaws/
(describing changes between the markup and the initial draft, which conditioned immunity on
certification of “best practices” by a board headed by the Attorney General)
https://cdt.org/insights/amendments-to-earn-it-act-cant-fix-the-bills-fundamental-flaws/;
Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act, S. 797, 117th Cong. (2020) (creating
procedural requirements for intermediaries) [hereinafter PACT Act]; Ending Support for
Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019) (giving the FTC the power to certify
whether an intermediary receives immunity based on whether its moderation is biased against
a “political party, political candidate, or political viewpoint”).
8 S. 299, 117th Cong. (2020) (proposing carve outs to “civil rights laws,” “stalking,
harassment, or intimidation laws,” “human rights law” and “wrongful death actions.”); The
EARN IT Act, S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020) (proposing a carveout for laws that punish the
distribution or possession of “Child Sexual Abuse Material”).
9 PACT Act, S. 797, 117th Cong. § 5(c)(1)(A) (2021) (proposing that injunctions pursuant to
court orders should be not immunized, that the immunity will be an affirmative defense that
must be proved by “the preponderance of the evidence,” and eliminates the immunity if “the
provider or user has accepted payment to make the speech available or, in whole or in part,
created or funded the creation of the speech”).
10 See, e.g., The Health Misinformation Act, S. 2448, 117th Cong. (2021) (proposing that
online intermediaries should lose Section 230 immunity if they host health misinformation, as
determined by the HHS, during a national health emergency, without establishing a cause of
action directed toward that misinformation).
11 See Gilad Edelman, Everything You’ve Heard About Section 230 is Wrong, WIRED (May
6, 2021), https://www.wired.com/story/section-230-internet-sacred-law-false-idol/.
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and Victims to Fight Online Trafficking Act (“SESTA-FOSTA”) and online
secondary copyright liability.12 While the comprehensive model under the DMCA
gives policymakers more power to push and pull on different rights, empirical research
shows those levers can be unpredictable and the resulting governance system might
end up mimicking the contours of our flawed First Amendment jurisprudence. In
contrast, the “common law confusion” leads to results so scattered they are difficult to
justify under almost any framework.
Finally, I conclude by considering some principles in enacting intermediary
liability reform to avoid the worst effects revealed by the preceding analysis.
II. FRAMEWORK
First, Part A describes Section 230 and some basic terminology. Then, Part B
describes the classic theory of intermediary liability and immunity, a theory that is
centered on preventing legal speech from being silenced by over-cautious
intermediaries given traditional tort liability that treats intermediaries as publishers.
Critics of contemporary intermediary liability schemes generally argue that these
schemes overprotect speech13 by protecting unlawful speech as well as lawful speech.
I argue that this binary between lawful and unlawful content is limiting. Instead,
especially given contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence and our background
criminal and tort systems, we need to take into account the effect on “lawful but awful
speech,”14 and “unlawful but not awful speech,”15 as well as the process claims of
users. Privileging certain types of claims almost certainly means devaluing others—
and the types of moderation systems that are incentivized in turn privilege and devalue
certain claims. But looking at content moderation systems as they exist reveals the
limits of an expanded adjudicatory framework; reformers need to consider extraadjudicatory variables like the types of content moderation systems that are feasible
or the effects on non-adjudicatory content moderation practices, like additional speech
by intermediaries.
A.

Section 230 and Terminology

First, it is necessary to review what Section 230 is and what it does, as well as
some basic terminology that will be used throughout this Article.
Federal Courts use a three-part test to determine whether a defendant may claim
the absolute immunity to tort liability supplied by Section 230—specifically §
230(c)(1).16

12 See discussion infra Part III.
13 The argument that the plaintiff can still sue the speaker is at best naïve and at worst made
in bad faith: most plaintiffs are upset defamatory or other illegal content is amplified across the
web, not that it was said at all.
14 Such as hate speech and misinformation. See discussion infra Part II.B.ii, II.C.i.
15 Such as the speech of sex workers. See discussion infra Part III.B.iii.
16 See, e.g., FTC v. LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016). As a preliminary
manner any reform proposal that claims it will change the law by reforming § 230(c)(2) without
somehow tying that provision to (c)(1) is evidence the reformer does not understand how § 230
works.
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(1) The defendant must be a supplier or user of an interactive computer service
(ICS); functionally, this includes virtually all online providers (social media platforms,
search engines, website operators, internet service providers,) and their users. 17
(2) The defendant must be treated as a publisher or speaker. Whenever the harm
alleged by a plaintiff comes from third-party content—content not created by the
defendant—the suit is treating the defendant as a “publisher or speaker”18 whether the
plaintiff is seeking damages or injunctive relief.19 Thus, suits that arise from the
defendant’s own non-moderation actions are not immunized.20
(3) The defendant must not have created or developed the unlawful content. Under
the “material contribution” test,21 which has become a de facto national standard,22 it
is not the extent to which the defendant interacts, adds to, or solicits the content, but
whether their interaction contributes to what makes that material unlawful.

17 See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357–58 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that
both Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg qualify for § 230 immunity); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d
1018, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “users” of interactive computer services are
covered under the statutory language as well as providers).
18 This includes not just defamation, but various theories of negligence and civil rights suits.
See, e.g., Fair Hous. Couns. v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that § 230 provides immunity from discrimination suits); Zeran v. Am. Online, 129
F.3d 237, 238 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 230 provides immunity for negligence suits).
19 See generally Small Just., LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 873 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 2017);
Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465 (2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, 206
F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000).
20 See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
plaintiff’s claim of promissory estoppel is not barred by § 230 because she “does not seek to
hold Yahoo liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party content, but rather as the counterparty to a contract, as a promisor who has breached”).
21 Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1167 (defining “develops” as when the defendant
“contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct”). For example, the court in
Roommates.Com found that the Defendant (a service that connected potential roommates) could
not claim immunity in a discrimination claim for harms caused by asking users allegedly
unlawful questions and requiring them to indicate certain protected identities (e.g., gender,
sexual orientation) and their preferences toward those identities with a mandatory drop-down
menu, id. at 1164–72, but they would receive immunity from any harms caused by an
“Additional Comments” section where users could post anything, id. at 1173–75. Whereas the
platform contributed to the illegality of the content in the first two instances by requiring users
to engage in potentially discriminatory acts, in the third instance they created a forum for
speakers who may or may not use it to engage in unlawful speech.
22 See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings, 755 F.3d 398, 410 (6th Cir. 2014)
(identifying Roommates.Com as the “leading case” on defining “develops”). But see Eric
Goldman, 2021 Section 230 Year-in-Review, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Jan. 29, 2022)
(collecting important Section 230 precedents from the previous year and finding that “[t]he
standard Section 230 case remains a quick defense win, but those are overshadowed by dramatic
rulings increasingly favoring plaintiffs), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/01/2021section-230-year-in-review.htm.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss2/6

6

2022]

INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY REGULATION

207

If this defendant meets all three prongs (which can be, and usually are, met at the
motion to dismiss stage), the case against them is dismissed.
This immunity applies to:
(1) Most state civil causes of action and criminal l prohibitions,23 and
(2) Most federal civil causes of action.
This immunity does not apply to:
(1) Federal Criminal Law.24
(2) Intellectual Property Law.25
(3) The application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 or “similar State law.”26
(4) Federal suits arising out of 18 U.S.C. § 1595 or state criminal
prosecutions “if [in either case] the conduct underlying the charge would
constitute a violation of § 1591” (an anti-sex trafficking provision).27
The crux of this analysis is usually the “material contribution” standard because
most intermediaries are ICSs and most causes of action are covered.28 Under that
standard, intermediaries are only liable when they contribute to the illegality of the
content; taking down, leaving up, promoting, soliciting, ratifying, and even paying for
content does not create liability simply because the content in question is unlawful.
There are unlawful content moderation decisions—for instance, withholding housing
advertisements on the basis of race29 or creating an implied contract to take down

23 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
24 Id. § 230(e)(1).
25 Id. § 230(e)(2). There is currently a circuit split on whether this extends to state intellectual
property law. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 298–304 (D.N.H. 2008);
Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 702–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Contra Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir 2007).
26 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(4). As Professor Goldman explains, this “is functionally a null set
because it is almost impossible for a defendant to simultaneously violate the ECPA and qualify
for Section 230.” That is, they would almost certainly violate the “material contribution”
standard if they violated the ECPA. Eric Goldman, Overview of United States’ Section 230
Internet Immunity, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY, 161 (Giancarlo
Frosio ed., 2020).
27 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5).
28 See Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357–58 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Batzel v. Smith,
333 F.3d 1018, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2002); Fair Hous. Couns. v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008); Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 237, 238 (4th Cir. 1997).
29 See generally Brief for Upturn in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Facebook’s Motion
to Dismiss First Amended Complaint as Amicus Curiae, Mobley v. Facebook, 344 F.Supp.3d
1089 (2018) (No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD).
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content30—that might give rise to liability, but they do so regardless of the legality of
the third-party content. Furthermore, the preemption of state laws means this broad
immunity is a national system31 and intermediaries do not need to tailor liability to a
particular state.
Section 230 also creates procedural protections. Because the “material
contribution” standard excludes so much content moderation,32 inquiries into motive
are functionally barred. Forbidding inquiries into motive ensures that suits against
online intermediaries are usually dismissed before discovery at the “Motion to
Dismiss” stage.33 Because discovery is expensive and embarrassing, winning prior to
it can be as important to defendants as winning at all.34
This combination of substantive and procedural protections means that
intermediaries are free from almost any liability incentive to adopt a particular kind of
content moderation (with the notable exception of Copyright law), with market and
cultural incentives as the driving factor.35 It also allows actors who are willing to
weather bad press to use Section 230 as a shield against liability for actions that would
almost certainly render them liable in an offline context.36
I will discuss the empirical effects of Section 230 in greater detail below. But one
underappreciated effect of Section 230 is that it has allowed courts (and to some extent
policymakers) to ignore the existence of the multiplicity of actors involved in virtually
any use of the internet—these actors are colloquially known as the “stack.”37 There is
no agreed upon way to classify those actors. One approach looks to the “layers” of the

30 See Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009).
31 Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 is Better than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 33, 44–45 (2019).
32 Kendra Albert et al., FOSTA in Legal Context, 52 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1084, 1097
n.51 (2021).
33 Goldman, supra note 31, at 39–42.
34 See, e.g., Joan Coaston, Rep. Devin Nunes’s Bizarre $250 Million Lawsuit Against Twitter,
Explained,
VOX
(Mar.
20,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/3/20/18272786/devin-nunes-twitter-lawsuit-trump-social-media-law
(arguing
that the point of the lawsuit is to get to the discovery phase of the trial in order to obtain records
on Twitter’s internal content moderation practices).
35 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1618–30 (2018) (describing how cultural background,
corporate responsibility, and market incentives (most importantly) drive content moderation
systems and decision making).
36 See, e.g., Citron & Wittes, supra note 7, at 402 (describing “The Dirty” as a gossip site
where people are encouraged to post “‘dirt’ on people they know,” who are then subjected to “a
torrent of abuse”).
37 Georgia Evans, Down the Stack: Power and Accountability in Internet Intermediaries’
Content
Moderation
Decisions,
KROEGER POL’Y REV.
(July
9,
2021),
https://www.kroegerpolicyreview.com/post/down-the-stack-power-and-accountability-ininternet-intermediaries-content-moderation-decisions.
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internet in terms of how communication flows between users.38 However, that sort of
linear approach misses the web-like nature of how we experience the internet.39 Thus,
others have advocated for a functional approach that looks at the role of the actor. 40
Regardless, there is general agreement among commentators that certain actors, like
the owners of physical infrastructure and Internet Service Providers (ISPs), should not
discriminate between users on the basis of content41 and should not be liable for that
content. In contrast, there is near-universal agreement that individual users can
discriminate on the basis of content and are liable for the content they create, even
under Section 230.42 The difficult questions pertain to the hosting of third-party
content in between those two extremes.
The courts have never had a chance to wrestle with those issues because Section
230 turns this spectrum into a binary: if the content is not “yours,” you are not liable
for it, whether you are an ISP like Verizon, run a site like Ravelry where users upload
knitting templates,43 a blogger with a comment section, or a Facebook user who
uploads a defamatory post authored by a third-party.44 This is not necessarily a bad

38 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture
and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 816–17 (2004) (describing the flow of information
from the user, the “Content Layer,” to the “Application Layer,” which are the “programs that
use the Internet,” to the “transport layer,” “which breaks the data into packets,” to the “Internet
Protocol Layer” that “handles the flow of data over the network” to the “Link Layer” that
“interface[s] between users’ computers and the physical layer,” and the “Physical Layer,” the
actual physical infrastructure data travels across).
39 See e.g., Free Speech: Only as Strong as the Weakest Link, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/free-speech-weak-link (last visited April 25, 2021).
40 Jack Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2037–38 (2011)
(making a distinction between “basic internet services,” “payment services,” and “content
curators” based on how they interact with content).
41 See id. at 2038; Solum & Chung, supra note 38, at 878–79. But see U.S. Telecom Ass’n
v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that net
neutrality provisions violate the First Amendment).
42 Eric Goldman, Section 230 Doesn’t Protect Repeating Rumours—La Liberte v. Reid,
TECH. & MKT. L. BLOG (July 30, 2020), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/07/section230-doesnt-protect-repeating-rumors-la-liberte-v-reid.htm (reporting favorably on a
defamation case where the defendant unsuccessfully argued that reposting a video then
commenting on that video in an allegedly defamatory way is not protected by Section 230
because the defendant was the source of the defamatory content).
43 About Ravelry, https://www.ravelry.com/about (lasted visited Aug. 5, 2021).
44 In Europe, for instance, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that it does not violate
Article 10 (which guarantees freedom of expression) of the European of the European
Convention on Human Rights for France to hold a politician liable for not deleting comments
that amounted to unlawful hate speech on a Facebook post that was otherwise lawful. Politician
Fined In Criminal Proceedings for Failing to Act Promptly by Deleting Comments From His
Public Facebook Account Inciting Hatred: No Violation of the Convention, REGISTRAR OF EUR.
CT.
OF
HUM.
RTS.
(Sept.
2,
2021),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-71060759621510&filename=Judgment%20Sanchez%20v.%20France%20-
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thing; as discussed below, courts are not necessarily good at understanding and
classifying actors in the stack. In this Article, I will use the term “intermediary” to
mean any online actor who hosts third-party content. When I discuss “high-revenue”
intermediaries, I am specifically referring to high-revenue actors like Facebook45 and
Google,46 not high-traffic intermediaries like Wikipedia.47
B.

Classic Theory of Intermediary Liability Immunity

The arguments for and against intermediary liability immunity have been made
before. I briefly recite the justifications to show that the concern is with the protection
of legally valid claims, be they speech claims or tort claims. Those who are in favor
of more intermediary immunity call attention to the effects on legally valid speech
claims,48 while those in favor of less intermediary liability immunity focus on the
effects on legally valid tort claims.49 As discussed below, this binary misses the heart
of many of the conversations about the responsibilities of internet intermediaries.
1.

Pro Intermediary Immunity

In the United States, there are two primary arguments for intermediary liability
immunity: the “moderator’s dilemma” and the threat of “collateral censorship.” 50
While the moderator’s dilemma engages with effects of intermediary immunity on
extralegal claims, it does not explain the scope of Section 230 immunity.51 That is
better explained by the theory of collateral censorship, which focuses on the effects of

%20%20conviction%20of%20a%20politician%20for%20not%20promptly%20removing%20
hate%20speech%20from%20his%20Facebook%20site.pdf.
45 Facebook reported $28 billion in revenue in the fourth quarter of 2020. Facebook Reports
Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2020 Results, FACEBOOK (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2021/Facebook-Reports-FourthQuarter-and-Full-Year-2020-Results/default.aspx.
46 Google’s parent company, Alphabet, reported that in the fourth quarter of 2020 they
received almost $53 billion in revenue from Google services. Alphabet Announces Fourth
Quarter
and
Fiscal
Year
2020
Results,
ALPHABET
(Feb.
2,
2021),
https://abc.xyz/investor/static/pdf/2020Q4_alphabet_earnings_release.pdf.
47 There is no generally accepted metric for traffic statistics, but Wikipedia is, by some
measurements, the most popular website in the United States. Joshua Hardwick, Top 100 Most
Visited Websites by Search Traffic (2021), AHREFS BLOG (Jan. 1, 2021),
https://ahrefs.com/blog/most-visited-websites/. Yet, it had revenues of approximately $129
million in 2019–2020. Independent Auditor’s Report, 2019, 2020, WIKIMEDIA (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/foundation/f/f7/Wikimedia_Foundation_FY20192020_Audit_Report.pdf.
48 See infra Part II.B.i.
49 See infra Part II.B.ii.
50 See generally Klonick, supra note 35, at 1604–09.
51 See infra note 57.
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intermediary immunity on valid speech claims.52 Defenders of Section 230 generally
argue that the importance of those speech claims outweighs any harms. 53
Before Section 230 was passed, the story goes that online intermediaries who
moderated third-party content were liable for any third-party defamatory material on
their service (“publisher liability”),54 while online intermediaries who took no actions
to moderate content were only liable upon notice and failure to remove material
(“distributor liability”).55 This created the moderator’s dilemma: those that did not
moderate, and thus allowed First Amendment-protected spam and pornography, risked
less liability for defamation suits than those who did. The fear was that this system
incentivized a dirty, scam-filled internet and prevented parents from being able to
protect their children56—so called “lawful but awful” content. It is not clear that two
unpublished trial court cases are a firm foundation for this description of the “internet
before Section 230”,57 but there were at least credible fears that intermediaries would
be punished for moderating content. The problem with the moderator’s dilemma is
that it does not explain the scope of Section 230 immunity described above, which
does away with distributor liability altogether and replaces it with the material
contribution standard unknown at common law. One could also solve the moderator’s
dilemma by having distributor liability regardless of whether the intermediary also
moderates lawful but awful content.
Instead, the scope of Section 230 immunity is better explained by the theory of
collateral censorship. This theory holds that if distributor liability is the norm and
intermediaries are liable for user content they have notice of, intermediaries will apply
the “Dennis formula” of traditional tort law to contested speech, “serv[ing] the
function of the court in making determinations about the costs and benefits of
speech.”58 However, instead of applying that formula neutrally, proponents of this
theory argue that intermediaries will err against allowing speech to remain up because
they lack any legal incentive to keep content up, leading to the collateral censorship

52 See infra note 59.
53 See infra pp. 13–14.
54 Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24,1995) (“[T]he critical issue to be determined by this court is whether . . . PRODIGY
exercised sufficient editorial control over its computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher
with the same responsibilities as a newspaper.”).
55 Cubby v. Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that Compuserve
was a distributor because it had “little to or no editorial control over” the publications it carried).
56 H.R. REP. NO. 104–458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
57 The moderator’s dilemma is often “proven” by comparing Stratton Oakmont with Cubby,
despite a latter ruling arguably overruling the most extreme interpretation of Stratton Oakmont.
See Lunney v. Prodigy Servs., 94 N.Y.2d 242, 250–51 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that Prodigy’s
overall “passive character” meant it was not a publisher for the purposes of determining liability
and that there is no common law duty to verify users, contrary to the trial court in Stratton
Oakmont’s finding that any moderation led to publisher liability).
58 Schruers, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third Party Content, 88 VA. L.
REV. 205, 238 (2002).
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of lawful speech.59 Indeed, in the United States, it is not just that intermediaries suffer
no liability from removing lawful content; absent a contract, they arguably have a
constitutional right to control the information on their services.60
This is the theory advanced in Zeran v. American Online,61 in which the Fourth
Circuit held that Section 230 precluded distributor liability—that is, liability upon
notice and failure to remove—as well as publisher liability.62 The Court explained:
The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern. Congress
recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech . . .
The imposition of tort liability on service providers for the communications
of others represented, for Congress, simply another form of intrusive
government regulation of speech. 63
Thus, while the moderator’s dilemma is concerned that intermediaries will undermoderate to avoid liability altogether, the theory of collateral censorship is concerned
that lawful speech on the boundaries of unlawful speech with be over-moderated.64
Defenders further argue that this boundary speech is often quite important beyond the
autonomy interests of the speakers. Defamation is notoriously contextual, 65 and
59 Id. at 240–41. See generally Felix Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of
Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293 (2011); see also Daphne Keller, The Right
Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data Protection
Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 287, 291 (2018) (“Abusive removal demands are a
problem whenever OSPs . . . operate ‘notice-and-takedown’ systems, under which claimants
submit legal notices or requests for removal of online expression.”); Seth F. Kreimer,
Censorship By Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the
Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 27–32 (2006); Jack Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile
Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2300 (1999).
60 Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that a “right-ofreply” law was unconstitutionally compelled speech); see also Prager Univ. v. Google LLC,
951 F.3d 991, 996–99 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that YouTube is not a public forum and therefore
private actors have no constitutional right of access). This strict state-action doctrine is not the
international approach to major online intermediaries. See, e.g., Matthias C. Kettemann & Anna
Sophia Tiedeke, Back up: Can Users Sue Platforms to Reinstate Deleted Content?, 9 INTERNET
POL’Y REV. (2020) (discussing a German case where Facebook was forced to reinstate a farright party’s Facebook group); CasaPound v. Facebook case summary, GLOB. FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/casapound-v-facebook/
(last visited Apr. 27, 2021) (describing a similar situation in Italy).
61 Zeran v. American Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
62 Id. at 331–34 (ruling that “distributor liability” was merely a subset of publisher liability
and thus covered by the text of the statute).
63 Id. at 330.
64 Klonick, supra note 35, at 1606–08.
65 James Grimmelman, To Err is Platform, Response to Olivier Sylvain's Essay
“Discriminatory Designs on User Data,” KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/err-platform (“It is no accident that the heartland of Section
230 is defamation: It is a doctrinal swamp where cases often turn on subtle nuances of
meaning.”); Daphne Keller, Dolphins in the Net, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, 14 (Sept. 4,
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important political speech can be plausibly defamatory.66 Furthermore, the abuse of
defamation by a few powerful actors67 or government pressure on intermediaries to
moderate speech a certain way (“jawboning”68) could have worrying effects on a
democracy—that is, there is an audience interest to hear this boundary speech as
well.69 But the focus is on the threat to lawful speech: speech to which there is no
valid legal objection. The solution in the United States is to err on the side of speech

2019),
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2019/09/filtering-facebook-introducing-dolphinsnet-new-stanford-cis-white-paper-or-why (“Both defamation and speech about public figures
are widely considered too context-dependent for even judges to assess easily.”). In the United
States a successful defamation suit generally requires “(a) a false and defamatory statement
concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least
to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement
irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. L. INST. 1977). To prove a statement is
“defamatory” (let alone false) a plaintiff must show “it tends so to harm the reputation of another
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him.” Id. § 559. In describing the application of this standard, the Restatement
cautions that “[a] communication to be defamatory need not tend to prejudice the other in the
eyes of everyone in the community . . . nor even in the eyes of a majority of them . . . . On the
other hand, it is not enough that the communication would be derogatory in the view of a single
individual or a very small group of persons, if the group is not enough to constitute a substantial
minority.” Id. § 559, cmt. e. Furthermore, whether the defamatory message was understood by
the recipient to be defamatory is a question of fact for the jury. Id. § 614.
66 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[W]e consider this case against
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”).
67 See, e.g., GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 229–55 (2006) (describing the factual
background of Sullivan, the concerted efforts by the Alabaman political establishment to use
defamation to prevent any out-of-state journalists to even enter the state). Nor are these tactics
historical. See, e.g., McClatchy California Opinion Editors, Editorial: Devin Nunes wants to
intimidate the press with lawsuits—and he’s not alone, THE FRESNO BEE (Apr. 21, 2021),
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/editorial-devin-nunes-wants-to-intimidate-the-presswith-lawsuits-and-hes-not-alone/ar-BB1fU7ud; see also Albert et al., supra note 32, at 7.
68 Derek E. Bambauer, How Section 230 reform endangers internet free speech, BROOKINGS:
TECH STREAM (July 1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-section-230-reformendangers-internet-free-speech/; Balkin, supra note 40, at 2019–21; Klonick, supra note 35, at
1650–52 (describing mostly non-U.S. requests to block content). More recently, American
officials have caught up with their foreign counterparts. See, e.g., Chandelis Duster, Kamala
Harris defends her push to get Trump’s Twitter account suspended, CNN (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/16/politics/kamala-harris-trump-twitter-suspensioncnntv/index.html; Bobby Allyn, Stung by Twitter, Trump Signs Executive Order to Weaken
Social
Media
Companies,
NPR
(May
28,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/28/863932758/stung-by-twitter-trump-signs-executive-order-toweaken-social-media-companies.
69 Keller, supra note 59, at 320.
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and give intermediaries broad immunity for hosting unlawful speech on their platform,
rather than incentivizing them to moderate unlawful speech and sweep up lawful and
useful speech in the process.
Though commentators have varied more than is recognized on what the scope of
that immunity is or should be,70 this analysis generally errs on the side of speech71—
unsurprisingly, given the First Amendment jurisprudence of the United States. 72 For
instance, Professor Grimmelman has argued that the “fundamental premise” of
Section 230 is that platforms make mistakes and “the mistakes caused by liability are
worse than the mistakes caused by immunity.”73 American academics take this stance
even when they write about other systems; for instance, Professor Keller begins her
analysis of the GDPR by noting that “[a]busive removal demands are a problem
whenever [intermediaries] . . . operate ‘notice-and-takedown’ systems” and that “[n]o
matter what one thinks about the proper scope of legitimate delisting or removal
requests, the abusive ones are a problem.”74 But for critics of intermediary liability
immunity, abusive notices might be the acceptable cost of preventing legitimate harm.
2.

Critics of Intermediary Liability Immunity

The arguments of (good faith) critics of Section 230 comes down to a basic
disagreement with Grimmelman and Keller’s premise. Contrary to Section 230
backers, they argue the mistakes incentivized by immunity outweigh the mistakes
incentivized by liability. Their proposed reforms (if not their rhetoric) are similarly
focused on the harms of unlawful speech—only they incentivize intermediaries’
adjudications to ensure they do privilege valid non-speech claims.
Some commentators have argued that a complete repeal of Section 230 would
“improve” the internet.75 Most critics of Section 230, however, have attempted to limit
Section 230 reform in a way that will limit the effects on lawful speech. For instance,
70 See generally Balkin, supra note 40, at 2044–47 (arguing that intermediaries should be
liable if they abide by certain “due process” requirements); Wu, supra note 59, at 344–45
(arguing that intermediaries should be liable when they induce unlawful speech); Schruers,
supra note 58, at 256 (arguing Section 230 “permits ISPs to apply the Dennis formula to content
objectively”); Balkin, supra note 59, at 2301 (arguing that intermediaries should be held liable
when they have the “right to control the speech” when there is “the joint collective production
of a harm” or “the private censor [has a] superior ability to avoid harm”).
71 Jonathan Zittrain, Three Eras of Digital Governance, SSRN, 1–6 (Oct. 2, 2019)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3458435.
72 See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (“[T]he First
Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing
it.”).
73 Grimmelman, supra note 65, at 10.
74 Keller, supra note 59, at 291 (emphasis added).
75 Adi Robertson, What Will Changing Section 230 Mean for the Internet?, THE VERGE (Feb.
26,
2021),
https://www.theverge.com/22302850/section-230-reform-internet-speechmoderation-platforms (Carrie Goldberg, answering a question about the effects of a complete
repeal of Section 230 on the internet, replied: “[i]t would improve it.”); Bruce Reed & James P.
Steyer, Why Section 230 hurts kids, and what to do about it, PROTOCOL (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.protocol.com/why-section-230-hurts-kids.
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Professors Danielle Keats Citron and Benjamin Wittes have proposed conditioning
intermediary liability immunity on whether the service “takes reasonable steps to
prevent unlawful uses of its services.”76 Putting aside substantive critiques of the
proposal, the text of the law is trying to rebalance the weight that intermediaries give
when adjudicating conflicting claims by pressuring intermediaries to take tort claims
more seriously, just as Section 230 (arguably) allows intermediaries to take speech
claims more seriously. But this is complicated by their (and other critics’) reasons for
supporting Section 230 reform.
For instance, Citron and Wittes argue that “cyber mobs” are a problem online,77
without defining what law “cyber mobs” violate. Similarly, Senator Klobuchar has
proposed a bill that would strip immunity if intermediaries republish “health
misinformation,” despite most health misinformation being protected by the First
Amendment.78 Over and over again, critics of Section 230 argue that reforming it will
lead to less “lawful but awful” speech, and defenders retort that the First Amendment,
not Section 230, protects that speech.79
Both sides make two mistakes. First, both gloss over the nuanced interplay
between these different categories—lawful speech, unlawful speech, valid tort claims,
invalid tort claims, let alone process claims, or the effects of different systems of
content moderation—as discussed below. For instance, while it is true that the First
Amendment protects a lot of misinformation, we should not dismiss out of hand (nor
assume) that the “silver lining” to any chilling effects on speech that results from
Section 230 reform might be less “lawful but awful” speech.80 Second, especially in
the United States, we should not confuse the legality and normative value of speech
or personhood claims.
C.

Speech, Personhood, and Process Claims—And Their Limits

Below, I develop an expanded framework for thinking about the claims of different
parties in intermediary adjudications. First, I reconceptualize the competing claims all
in terms of rights claims and discuss the interactions between privileging different
types of claims in intermediary adjudications. Then, I discuss the limits of that
adjudicatory framework when thinking about content moderation systems more
broadly.
1.

Defining Speech and Personhood Claims

Below, I develop a framework for discussing rights claims in intermediary liability
systems. On the one side are valid or invalid speech claims, while on the other side is
what I term “personhood” claims, which can be legally cognizable (and valid or
76 Citron & Wittes, supra note 7, at 411 (emphasis added).
77 Id. at 411.
78 See generally Health Misinformation Act, S. 2448, 117th Cong. (2021).
79 See, e.g., Jess Miers, Your Problem is not with Section 230, but the 1st Amendment,
TECHDIRT (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20201030/09165945621/yourproblem-is-not-with-section-230-1st-amendment.shtml.
80 Michael Lavi, Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 528 (2020) (citing
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: HOW FALSEHOODS SPREAD, WHY WE BELIEVE THEM, AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE 74–75 (2014)).
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invalid) or extralegal. Different intermediary systems can systemically privilege
different types of claims. I argue that the examination of extralegal personhood claims
is especially important in the United States, where First Amendment exceptionalism
has prevented collective judgment, at least through formal channels, on a variety of
important issues. I conclude by discussing the interaction of different types of content
moderation systems with those rights.
First, an explanation of terminology. The discussion above used a uniquely
American conception of rights that likely informed the speech-protective analysis. In
the United States, rights are “trumps;”81 another way of conceptualizing the danger of
intermediary liability is that it functionally disregards a trump that a citizen could play
against the state (the right to free speech) by moving the adjudication to a private actor
who is immune from that trump.82 The non-speech side of the adjudication does not
involve constitutional rights in American jurisprudence, but a “right of action,” be it
common law defamation or privacy suits, intellectual property suits, or antidiscrimination suits under federal and state statutes. However, we can also see the nonspeech side of an intermediary liability adjudication as involving rights claimants: the
rights of intellectual property holders, and what in international law is referred to as
the rights to “reputation,” “privacy,” 83 and to be free from “discrimination.”84
For lack of a better term, I will refer to these rights claims collectively as
“personhood rights.”85 In doing so, I acknowledge there are causes of action that are
difficult to describe as “rights”86 and others that might have little to do with

81 See generally Jamal Greene, Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2018) (cataloguing
and critiquing the conception of rights as absolute and endorsing a proportionality approach to
rights); see also JAMAL GREENE, HOW RIGHTS WENT WRONG: WHY OUR OBSESSION WITH
RIGHTS IS TEARING AMERICA APART (2021).
82 Indeed, there is deep a connection between “Rights as Trumps” and the United States’
strict state action doctrine: it makes no sense to think of rights as trumps if they can be asserted
against private actors with trumps of their own.
83 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, adopted and opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation”) [hereinafter “ICCPR”].
84 Id. art. 26 (guaranteeing both freedom from state discrimination and “equal and effective
protection against discrimination” on the basis of protected classes); id. art. 20 (“Any advocacy
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law.”).
85 Cf. Jaani Riordan, A Theoretical Taxonomy of Intermediary Liability, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY, 18–26 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020).
86 For instance, the “disclosure” claim described by Riordan requiring intermediaries to give
would-be plaintiffs information so they can contact alleged infringers, might be rearticulated as
reflecting the guarantee that “everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks [on] privacy and reputation.” Id. at 25–26; ICCPR, supra note 83, at art.
17. A claim based on a “fake news” law might implicate some nebulous “right” to information.
See, e.g., Claude Reyes v. Chile, GLOB. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, COLUMBIA UNIV.
(Sept. 16, 2006), https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/claude-reyes-v-chile/
(describing a holding by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that Article 13 of the
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personhood. 87 But the term “personhood” captures the substance of most of the rights
and they are all rights insofar as they concern a specific adjudication.
Both speech rights and personhood rights can be valid or invalid; that is, as
determined by a court of law, the speech is either constitutionally protected, or there
is a valid personhood claim against it.88 For instance, consider an insulting and untrue
message toward the President posted on Facebook. Imagine the President sued the
poster for defamation. A court would determine, subject to constitutional limitations,
whether the poster was liable—whether the speech or the personhood claim asserted
was valid. Thus, these are claims—most content that intermediaries pass judgment on
have not been adjudicated as valid or invalid by a court.89 Thus, at this point we have
two sets of (basically) mutually exclusive claims: either the speech claim is valid, and
therefore any personhood claims against it are invalid, or the speech claim is invalid,
which means there is at least one valid personhood claim against it. This leads to the
framework of the classic theory of intermediary liability: maximizing valid claims.
But personhood claims can also be legally cognizable or extralegal.90 These
extralegal personhood claims are harms to a person that are not recognized by the legal
system. In the United States, it is not that these legal categories are “protected by the
First Amendment” as some commentators say, but that they are not legally cognizable
categories of speech at all.91 That something is hate speech, for instance, in that the

American Convention on Human Rights contains a right to seek and receive information as well
as the right to express information). The latter would seem to be stretching at least the American
notion of rights, especially given Article III limitations on “public” rights. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) (“[A] plaintiff raising only a generally
available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest
in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or
controversy.”).
87 For instance, in the United States personhood is not the primary justification for copyright
or other forms of intellectual property. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”) (emphasis added).
88 They are not actually exclusive insofar as states do not always prohibit the full range of
unprotected speech; for example, obscene speech in a jurisdiction with no obscenity law is
unprotected but has no valid personhood claim against it.
89 Even if it has been adjudicated in the past, almost all personhood claims involving speech
are contextual and therefore an instance speech previously adjudicated to be infringing a valid
personhood claim could be valid in a different context. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 65, at 23–
24 (“Some content really is, at least in some jurisdictions, illegal in every possible context. But
the only examples I am aware of (outside of countries like China) are very extreme and harmful
content, specifically child sexual abuse imagery (CSAI).”).
90 There are no “extralegal” speech claims, though perhaps claims to protect conduct that
border on speech would be a similar analogy.
91 Contra Andrew Marantz, Free Speech is Killing Us, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2019 (describing
John A. Powell’s position: “[h]e thinks that some aspects of our current First Amendment
jurisprudence—blanket protections of hate speech, for example—will also seem ridiculous in
retrospect.”).
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United States does not protect it; it might well infringe on copyright, it might be
defamatory, or it might violate Title IX. But it will not do so because it is hate speech.
Or, to return to the hypothetical above, imagine the President sued the poster not
because the message was false, but because the President disagreed with the political
viewpoint expressed.92 That is not a legally cognizable harm—it is extralegal. Thus,
the same underlying content can give rise to both legally cognizable and extralegal
personhood claims. Empirical evidence showing the extent to which conduct that
gives rise to certain types of extralegal personhood claims also creates legal liability
would be incredibly useful; unfortunately, it does not exist.
Considering extralegal personhood claims complicates the analysis of
intermediary liability designs. As discussed above, most analyses of intermediary
liability systems take for granted that the ideal situation is one in which a minimal
amount of lawful speech is taken down, and the maximum amount of unlawful speech
is taken down—that is, valid personhood claims are validated, and invalid and
extralegal claims are ignored. The disagreement is about how to balance those
competing claims. Grimmelman exemplifies this approach:
I will use “bad” as shorthand to describe content that would subject the poster
to civil or criminal liability under some non–Section 230 body of law, and
“good” as shorthand to describe content that would not. Of course, these
categories reflect contestable political judgments and can change over time.
But for purposes of discussing Section 230, they provide a useful baseline
because they embody collective judgments about what content society
considers acceptable and what content it does not; they challenge us to
explain why those judgments do or do not carry over from users to
platforms.93
But especially in the United States, depending on your normative priors, the goal
might not be to minimize the amount of lawful speech taken down (or even to
maximize unlawful speech taken down); instead, you might be more concerned with
combatting categories of speech that have no legal significance. Someone who has a
racial slur directed at them on Facebook, for example, probably has no legal cause of
action absent some other conduct by the speaker,94 even though many of us would be
fine with significant resources directed toward suppressing that type of speech, at least
on public-facing online intermediaries. Grimmelman’s response might be that there
has been no “collective judgment” about hate speech. But in the United States, our
exceptional First Amendment jurisprudence has short-circuited any democratic
attempt to decide whether hate speech is unlawful or what its boundaries would be.

92 Cf. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2020) (“The
President concedes that he blocked the Individual Plaintiffs because they posted tweets that
criticized him or his policies.”), vacated as moot, Biden v. Knight First Amendment Inst., 141
S. Ct. 1220 (2021).
93 Grimmelman, supra note 65, at n.1.
94 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458–59 (2011) (holding that speech on issues of
public interest cannot be prohibited for being “outrageous”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 389–90 (1992) (distinguishing discrimination laws like Title VII that punish conduct
from laws that punish the expression of discriminatory ideas).
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To be fair, even in less speech-protective democracies, there is not a perfect fit
between the laws and the collective moral judgments of society—there is still content
that is lawful but morally condemned.95 Hate speech laws usually require some
“incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence” condition 96 that makes them
narrower than the major intermediaries’ hate-speech policies (though those
intermediaries’ speech-based justifications of their hate-speech policies are interesting
and uniquely American).97 That is a good thing: unpopular political positions should
generally be protected; a society with a perfect fit between collective majority moral
judgment and the speech allowed would not be a society with free speech. But the
United States’ approach to free speech is exceptional,98 and goes beyond protecting
hate speech99 or threatening language,100 to preventing us from regulating

95 See, e.g., Amelie Heldt, Reading between the lines and the numbers: an analysis of the
First NetzDG reports, 8 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 9 (2019) (“Although, from a European
perspective there is a big overlap between unlawful and unwanted content, the definitions do
not completely intersect.”).
96 See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 20 (states must prohibit “advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.”); Canada Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, 319(1) (“Every one who, by communicating statements in any
public place, incites hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead
to a breach of the peace, is guilty of [a criminal offense].”) (emphasis added).
97

See,
e.g.,
Community
Standards:
12.
Hate
Speech,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech (“[W]e don’t allow hate speech
on Facebook. It creates an environment of intimidation and exclusion, and in some cases may
promote offline violence.”) (last visited Apr. 27, 2021); Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy (last visited Apr. 27,
2021) (“We recognize that if people experience abuse on Twitter, it can jeopardize their ability
to
express
themselves.”);
Hate
Speech
Policy,
YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939?hl=en (last visited Apr. 27, 2021) (“The
safety of our creators, viewers, and partners is our highest priority. We look to each of you to
help us protect this unique and vibrant community.”).
98 See, e.g., Albie Sachs, Reflections on the Firstness of the First Amendment in the United
States, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 179–92 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds.,
2019).
99 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
100 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363–64 (2003) (holding that a statute that
creates a presumption that cross burning is unlawful intimidation violates the First
Amendment); STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 86a (a German statute banning the
use and dissemination of “unconstitutional organizations” like the Nazi Party). But see Virginia,
538 U.S. at 391 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In our culture, cross burning has almost invariably
meant lawlessness and understandably instills in its victims well-grounded fear of physical
violence.”).
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elections,101 false statements outside historical categories,102 advertising,103 and
professional speech.104 Perhaps the realities of online discourse will force courts to
rethink their deregulatory First Amendment jurisprudence,105 but absent sustained
political pressure on the court (which is currently lacking), 106 there is little incentive
for them to change tack.

101 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010) (overruling the precedent
established in Austin v. Michigan Chambers of Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990) that an absolute ban
on corporate campaign expenditures was constitutional); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686,
695 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that the government has no compelling interest in
preventing contributions to corporate political action committees); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 749–50 (2011) (holding that there is no
permissible state interest in “leveling the playing field” and ensuring wealthy candidates and
those backed by moneyed interests do not drown out other positions); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572
U.S. 185, 218–23 (2014) (holding that limits on aggregate contributions are not justified by an
anti-circumvention rationale).
102 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (distinguishing older cases upholding
damages for “defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false
statement, such as an invasion of privacy or the costs of vexatious litigation” from the present
suit, which was premised on a newer statute that penalized false statements about military
service).
103 Compare the relatively flexible standard of review articulated in Bd. of Trs., State of N.Y.
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476–81 (1989) with the more recent approach articulated in Thompson v.
W. States Med. Ctr, 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) (“[I]f the Government could achieve its interests
in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do
so.”); see also, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001) (describing this fourth
prong as the “critical inquiry”); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 524–25 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the way both
Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor apply the fourth prong of Central Hudson, holding direct
bans or restrictions of products to be a less burdensome alternative than speech restrictions,
means—and rightly so—that restricting non-misleading information can never survive the
fourth prong, thus rendering the rest of the test superfluous).
104 Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 868–70 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that
regulations prohibiting “conversion therapy” are content-based regulations that receive strict
scrutiny and are unconstitutional); Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848 F.3d 1293, 1311 (11th Cir.
2017) (en banc) (holding that regulations of doctor’s ability to ask patients questions about guns
violate the commercial speech doctrine of the First Amendment).
105 See, e.g., Kyle Langvardt, Can the First Amendment Scale?, 1 J. OF FREE SPEECH L. 273,
274–75 (2021) (arguing that just as 19th Century approaches to contract became infeasible in
the industrial age, 20th Century approaches to speech will become infeasible in the digital age).
106 See, e.g., Andrew Solender, Democrats Introduce Bill Creating 18-Year Supreme Court
Term Limits, Nominations Every Two Years, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsolender/2021/09/03/democrats-introduce-bill-creating18-year-supreme-court-term-limits-nominations-every-two-years/?sh=3c74a05d2d30
(reporting on a recent court reform bill and describing it as a “long-shot legislation” given the
Republican filibuster-proof minority in the Senate).
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Most of the prior citations involved issues that were in the midst of fierce political
debate.107 As a result of our First Amendment exceptionalism, we do not know what
our collective judgment is toward those issues because we are not allowed to make
one. But it seems naïve to simply label that content “good.” Discussions of
intermediary liability, at least in the United States, must take extralegal personhood
claims seriously. Limiting the analysis of personhood claims to legally cognizable
claims would ignore fundamental debates going on about this speech. On the other
hand, there is no way to limit the discussion of extralegal personhood claims to “good”
claims—or even contested ones. Any intermediary liability system in the United States
that facilitates hate speech claims will in theory also facilitate censorious claims—for
instance, a personhood claim that you disagree with the political viewpoint of the
content and do not wish to see it.
Furthermore, those critical of the First Amendment should also take note of what
it fails to protect—that is, the types of speech that can be lawfully punished. As
discussed below, Section 230 probably protects invalid speech claims against valid
personhood claims. But whether we want unlawful speech to exist online is not as cutand-dry a normative question as it might seem, given the tort liability associated with
sex work,108 Computer Fraud Access and Abuse liability for making information more
widely available,109 and “non-abusive” copyright claims.110 Indeed, while the
conservative judiciary’s use of the First Amendment as a deregulatory tool to protect
property-like interests has been well documented, the gaps show a corresponding
move to allow property-based claims to overcome speech interests, especially speech
interests that are anathema to the conservative court.111 As with personhood claims,
107 See generally Tim Wu, Beyond First Amendment Lochnerism: A Political Process
Approach, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST.: FREE SPEECH FUTURES (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/beyond-first-amendment-lochnerism-a-political-processapproach. It is beyond the scope of this paper, but United States Equal Protection law enacts a
“colorblind” ideology that prevents the use of race to address de facto segregation. See, e.g.,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (striking
down a school assignment program that attempted to address de facto racial segregation,
concluding, “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race.”). Perhaps this “Equal Protection Locherism” has also prevented political
currents that will find an expression in online content moderation. See, e.g., Daniel Kriess et al,
The Need for Race-Concious Platform Policies to Protect Civic Life, TECH POLICY PRESS (Dec.
13, 2021) (arguing that major platforms need more race conscious content moderation policies,
but admitting that many have adopted such programs).
108 See infra Part IV.B.
109 See generally Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Reform., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cfaa (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
110 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004) (arguing that copying without
alterations in certain contexts should be considered fair use and protected by the First
Amendment).
111 See, e.g., Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. ___ (2021) (the majority opinion, in
ruling that a California regulation that guarantees access for labor organizations to farms that
house agricultural workers is a per se taking, never once addresses the impacts on speech and
association of such a ruling); see also id. at 15–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
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there are plenty of horrific speech acts that do violate existing tort laws; the point is
that there is a significant enough gap between the normative and the legal debates
about Section 230 that we cannot afford to confuse them. Many reformers, however,
simply assume that privileging certain rights claims will lead to certain outputs.
Privileging defamation claims will lead to less disinformation.112 Privileging antidiscrimination claims will lead to more inclusive spaces.113 I hope to have at least
complicated those assumptions.
2.

Speech and Personhood Claims and Intermediary Liability

There are two ways that intermediary liability systems can privilege speech and
personhood claims. First, they can do so directly, by privileging certain types of
claims. Second, they can do so indirectly, by incentivizing certain types of moderation
systems.
Using the framework discussed above, we should see a few basic relationships
between these categories. First, as discussed above, privileging speech claims should
lead to a devaluing of personhood claims, and vice versa. Second, privileging legally
cognizable claims should lead to a devaluing of extralegal claims, and vice versa. This
is less intuitive than the first relationship, because there is nothing theoretically
preventing an intermediary from moderating both lawful and unlawful speech.114 But
intermediaries, even wealthy ones, have finite resources and may be incentivized to
focus on lawful speech at the expense of extralegal personhood claims in a system that

majority opinion creates an incoherent distinction between health and safety regulations and
labor regulations); Erin Mayo Adam, The Supreme Court Struck Down a Key United Farm
Workers Win. The decision has Some Infamous Echoes, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 2, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/02/supreme-court-struck-down-key-unitedfarm-workers-win-decision-has-some-infamous-echoes/. This can also be seen in the gap
between the Court’s treatment of Copyright and other regulations that promote speech overall
by restricting some of it. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech
Law: What Copyright has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2001).
112 See, e.g., Jeremy Lewin, The Progressive Case for Libel Reform, THE WALL ST. J. (Apr.
5, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-progressive-case-for-libel-reform-11617638828
(“Hyperpartisanship and moral decay have reduced the reputational cost of public deceit.
Sullivan makes things worse by stripping away nearly all risk of legal liability for lying about
public figures or issues. By requiring plaintiffs to prove ‘actual malice,’ it bars accountability
except on a showing of a conscious intent to lie, or very close to it.”). But see Nabiha Syed,
Sullivan is Not the Problem, THE KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST.: LIES AND THE PRESS (Nov.
15, 2021) (arguing that critics of Sullivan who are concerned about misinformation miss the
crucial point because the principal harm is not to an individual’s reputation—the foundation of
defamation law—but to our public square through its sheer repetition). This approach is also
complicated by the de facto creation of “defamation free zones” for certain media actors. See,
e.g., Eric Goldman, Cable News Shows are Defamation-Free Zones—OANN v. Maddow, TECH.
& MKTG. L. BLOG (Aug. 25, 2021), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/08/cable-newsshows-are-defamation-free-zones-oann-v-maddow.htm.
113 Citron & Wittes, supra note 7, at 419–21.
114 Indeed, that is arguably the practice of most major online intermediaries.
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privileged legally cognizable claims. And it is worth noting that there are a variety of
high-traffic, low revenue sites that would struggle to do both.115
As to the types of moderation systems, there are three axes on which intermediaries
moderate content: reactive and proactive moderation, automatic and manual
moderation, and ex ante and ex post moderation.116 The first is whether the
moderation is in response to a particular user or on the intermediary’s independent
motion. The second is whether the moderation techniques are automated or manual.
The third is whether the moderation occurs before or after the user posts the content.
Functionally, both manual ex ante regulation and reactive ex ante regulation are null
sets at larger intermediaries.117
There is extensive evidence that moderation techniques like filtering and ex ante
monitoring,118 including certain types of ex ante moderation practices such as shutting
off access to certain types of content,119 privilege personhood claims at the expense
of speech claims. Thus, a system of intermediary liability that incentivizes filters,
monitoring, and the blocking of content should also privilege personhood claims
against speech claims. Unfortunately, we do not know enough about how proactive
and reactive moderation practices interact with different types of rights claims in
general.
3.

Process Claims

115 See supra note 47.
116 Klonick, supra note 35, at 1635.
117 To the first, as an empirical matter most ex ante moderation is automated. Id. at 1636. To
the second, it is not clear how a user could bring content to an intermediary’s attention before
it was posted.
118 See, e.g., Carey Shenkman et al, Do You See What I See? Capabilities and Limits of
Automated Multimedia Content Analysis, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH., 35–36 (May 20,
2021),
https://cdt.org/insights/do-you-see-what-i-see-capabilities-and-limits-of-automatedmultimedia-content-analysis/ (arguing that automated analysis tools have several drawbacks
and could infringe on user rights); Daphne Keller, Six Constitutional Hurdles For Platform
Speech Regulation, CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y, 4 (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2021/01/six-constitutional-hurdles-platform-speechregulation-0 (arguing that government-imposed monitoring obligations raise both First and
Fourth Amendment issues in the United States); Keller, supra note 65, at 8 nn.11–16 (Sept. 4,
2019) (collecting commentary critical of filters from both speech and process perspectives);
Keller, supra note 59, at 303–04 n.62 (collecting cases rejecting an imposition of a “duty to
monitor” using human rights jurisprudence); Daphne Keller, Problems With Filters in the
European Commission’s Platforms Proposal, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Oct. 5, 2017, 3:33
PM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/10/problems-filters-europeancommissionsplatforms-proposal; Daphne Keller & Annmarie Bridy, U.S. Copyright Office Section 512
Study: Comments in Response to Notice of Inquiry, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, 16–22 (Mar.
30, 2016), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/publications/us-copyright-office-section-512-studycomments-response-notice-inquiry (arguing that both “human” and “automated” monitoring
regimes risk suppressing more legal speech than a reactive notice regime).
119 FOSTA, CRAIGSLIST, https://www.craigslist.org/about/FOSTA (last visited May 2, 2021)
(explaining that, in the wake of SESTA-FOSTA, it could not risk running a classified section).
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Increasingly, the “grown up”120 alternative to balancing speech and personhood
claims is to ensure the process claims of users. Indeed, Professor Zittrain argues that
we are (or perhaps should be) transitioning from an era of “public health”121 to an era
of “process and legitimacy” in thinking about technology regulation.122 Below, I
describe process claims, their interaction with intermediary liability immunity
regimes, and their interaction with personhood and speech claims.
Zittrain describes process and legitimacy not in terms of the substantive outcomes,
or in terms of the ability of rights-holders to assert their rights, but in terms of fairness:
that “those who feel they have lost in a particular dispute or debate will not feel that
they have been taken advantage of, or that the project to which they are contributing
or are subject to . . . is not morally bankrupt.”123 My focus on claims will have less to
do with “legitimacy,” which is discussed more below. Instead, this analysis is
intentionally individualized; it looks at the effects on discrete adjudications, not on the
legitimacy of the overall system. Therefore, this analysis will focus on the process of
those adjudications: that the rules, whatever they may be, are enforced in a consistent
and fair manner.
We can consider a few fundamental aspects to process: notice; transparency; user
participation, including the right to appeal; and impartial judgment—what in the
United States is termed as “procedural” due process.124 The more that the users are
given an opportunity to know that the dispute exists and participate meaningfully in
that dispute, and the more impartial the arbiter, the more we can say the intermediary
liability system ensures process.125 At the most extreme level, users are given the most
“process” when all adjudication is done by courts.126
120 Daphne Keller, CDA 230 Reform Grows Up: The PACT Act has Problems, But it’s
Talking About the Right Things, THE CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y (July 16, 2020),
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/07/cda-230-reform-grows-pact-act-has-problemsit%E2%80%99s-talking-about-right-things.
121 Zittrain, supra note 71, at 6–7 (dealing with concerns about personhood claims and their
effects on society generally).
122 Id. at 8–9.
123 Id. at 9.
124 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–71 (1970) (holding that due process
requires “timely and adequate notice,” “an effective opportunity (for the recipient) to defend by
confronting adverse witnesses,” retaining counsel, an “impartial decisionmaker” who makes
decisions based on preestablished rules which they make public). But see Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (holding that due process consists of balancing the private interest
in the issue being adjudicated, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards” and the government interest rather than the specific procedures outlined in
Goldberg).
125 Some commentators have expressed skepticism about private governance systems
generally. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren & Maayan Perel, Guarding the Guardians: Content
Moderation by Online Intermediaries and the Rule of Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ONLINE
INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY., 670–73 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020).
126 See, e.g., Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability, THE MANILA PRINCIPLES,
https://manilaprinciples.org/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2021); The Santa Clara Principles on
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Intermediary liability regimes have not, historically, been structured with process
in mind, though in practice, its design always affects the procedural due process of
users of intermediaries. For example, in European courts that actually handle a fair
volume of cases against intermediaries on the merits, the cases usually only involve
the intermediary and the user asserting personhood claims—not the speaker.127 Not
being involved in a dispute concerning your claim (and not being notified about it) is
about the clearest denial of process possible—though, at least in those cases there is
an impartial arbiter.
Also, to the extent an intermediary liability system incentivizes a type of
moderation, it has effects on process. To return to Klonick’s taxonomy, there are three
axes on which intermediaries moderate content: reactive and proactive moderation,
automatic and manual moderation, and ex ante and ex post moderation.128 Reactive
moderation at least ensures one side knows the dispute exists (the side that initiated
the complaint), but to ensure more process intermediaries would have to ensure the
poster of the content is aware of the adjudication, can participate, is given reasons, etc.
The more important divide is between manual and automated moderation: whether it
is ex ante or ex post, automated moderation (without appeals or notice) gives virtually
no process to either side.129 Intermediary liability systems that incentivize filters and
other automated moderations systems incentivize intermediaries to not give users
process.
Finally, process is not neutral as to its effects on rights claims in an intermediary
liability scheme. Theoretically, increasing process requirements will generally
increase the “cost” of bringing a personhood claim, at least in a notice system,
functionally privileging speech claims against legally cognizable personhood claims.
Conversely, decreasing process, for instance by establishing quick removal deadlines,
will privilege personhood claims against speech claims.130 And to the extent a process
requirement forces personhood claimants to make their claims in terms of legally
cognizable harms, they will privilege legally cognizable personhood claims over
extralegal ones.
4.

Beyond the Rights Framework

The framework developed above is (intentionally) atomistic: it envisions content
moderation as discrete adjudications that consider the speech, personhood, and

Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation, SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES,
https://santaclaraprinciples.org/ (last visited May 2, 2021); see also Joan Barata, Positive Intent
Protections: Incorporating a Good Samaritan Principle in the EU Digital Services Act, CTR.
FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH. 14 (July 29, 2020), https://cdt.org/insights/positive-intentprotections-incorporating-a-good-samaritan-principle-in-the-eu-digital-services-act/ (arguing
that intermediaries should not be responsible for determining the illegality of third-party
content).
127 Keller, supra note 65, at 7–11.
128 Klonick, supra note 35, at 1635.
129 Nor is it clear that filters are particularly accurate or “impartial” arbiters. See FOSTA,
supra note 119.
130 evelyn douek, Governing Online Speech: From “Posts-As-Trumps” to Proportionality
and Probability, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 813 (2021).
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process claims of individuals involved in the dispute. That is useful for thinking about
the push and pull of different systems of intermediary liability, but it is an incomplete
picture. It ignores what we might call the “health” of online discourse; an audience
might not have a personhood “claim,” even an extralegal one, against a particular
speech, but in the aggregate might prefer more civil and productive online discourse.
The rights framework ignores an interest, discussed above, in the legitimacy of a
content moderation system. It implies a false binary between stay-up and take-down
for online content. And it ignores how intermediary liability systems interact with the
types of content moderation systems that are feasible under it.
The “health” of an online space is a fiercely contested normative question. But
research on that issue rarely occurs within an adjudicatory framework. For instance, a
researcher might consider what attributes correlate with the information quality of
Wikipedia pages,131 or why certain “spaces” on the internet seem vulnerable to
disinformation and misinformation.132 Moving outside that framework means
thinking in terms of inputs and outputs instead of rights.
Furthermore, moving away from an adjudicatory frame allows us to think about
legitimacy in private governance. For instance, Professors Elkin-Koren and Perels’
concept of “tinkering” seeks to hold private governance systems accountable by
“systematically test[ing] and record[ing] how online intermediaries respond to
representatives, like-real content that we prepare and submit to the platforms.”133
Relatedly, douek has suggested that intermediaries need to justify their rules with
public, normative reasons that can be debated but offer some sort of structured,
objective check on the decision-maker,134 be transparent about the error rates of
moderation systems,135 and adopt the “least restrictive means” of regulation.136 These
authors are concerned less with the individual adjudications than ensuring that the
public has a structured way to respond to them in the aggregate. Again, that would
normally be via the legislative process, but for many of these issues, especially in the
United States, legislative solutions are constitutionally prohibited.
Moving away from the framework also allows us to look at aspects of the rights
adjudications with fresh eyes. Remedies are an especially fruitful example; as multiple

131 See, e.g., Gerald Kane & Sam Ransbotham, Content and Collaboration: An Affiliation
Network Approach to Information Quality in Online Peer Production Communities, 27 INFO.
SYS. RSCH. 424 (2016).
132 See, e.g., Joan Donavan & Brian Friedberg, Source Hacking, DATA & SOC’Y (Sept. 4,
2019), https://datasociety.net/library/source-hacking-media-manipulation-in-practice/.
133 Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 125, at 676.
134 douek, supra note 130, at 821–23; see also Brenda Dvoskin, Representation Without
Elections: Civil Society Participation as a Remedy for the Democratic Deficits of Online Speech
Governance, VILLANOVA L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 58–60),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3986181 (making similar suggestions
about transparency and inclusion to ensure content moderation systems have democratic
legitimacy).
135 douek, supra note 130, at 824–25.
136 Id. at 825–26 (for example, by introducing friction or disclosure instead of banning
content).
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commentators have pointed out, there are multiple things that intermediaries can do
with content besides taking it down and leaving it up.137 But under the rights-based
frame, that binary is what matters: did the intermediary publish the unlawful content,
or didn’t it?138 Leaving the adjudicatory framework allows us to think of content
moderation more like online intermediaries do: systemically. Content moderation
tools involve reworking algorithms, amplifying trusted content, and countering
harmful speech with the platform’s own speech outside of individual cases. And those
systems can be organized in a variety of ways. An intermediary might take an
American, “categorical” approach to adjudicating speech, personhood, and process
claims, or they might opt for a more European “proportional” approach. Intermediaries
might take a centralized approach to adjudications139 or a decentralized one.140
Returning to Klonick’s axes of content moderation systems, their approach might be
more or less proactive, more or less automated, or might occur before or after the
speech is even published. The reasons for these differences might be market-based or
political. But the underlying intermediary liability system can at least incentivize
certain systems and might make others not economically feasible even though these
systems do not bear directly on issues of individual adjudications.
III. APPLICATION TO SECTION 230
As discussed above, Section 230 severely limits the civil liability connected with
online intermediaries’ content moderation systems. As a result, the simple answer to
the question, “what are Section 230’s effects?” is that it incentivizes whatever the
137 douek, supra note 130, at 787–89; see also Eric Goldman, Content Moderation Remedies,
MICH.
TECH.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3810580 (describing in detail the range of remedies used by private
content moderators over time and developing a normative framework for discussing the
different remedies available).
138 Daphne Keller, Amplification and its Discontents: Why Regulating the Reach of Online
Content is Hard, 1 J. OF FREE SPEECH L. 227, 237–39 (2021). If the content is curtailed to the
point of being a private message, that may go to whether a message is “published” under
common law defamation. It also may make a difference for the purpose of calculating damages.
Also, if intermediaries label content, that can be the basis for a defamation lawsuit and is outside
Section 230 because it is platform speech. Even non-meritorious lawsuits can deter or at least
make these type of individual labelling programs more expensive. See, e.g., Eric Goldman,
Twitter’s Content Moderation Explanations Aren’t Defamatory Per Se—Isaac v. Twitter, TECH.
& MKTG. L. BLOG (Sept. 2, 2021), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/09/twitterscontent-moderation-explanations-arent-defamatory-per-se-isaac-v-twitter.htm.
139

See, e.g., Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2021) (a good example of a “top-down” approach
where the intermediary sets and enforces the rules); see also evelyn doeuk, The Rise of Content
Cartels,
KNIGHT
FIRST
AMENDMENT
INST.
(Feb.
11,
2020),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the-rise-of-content-cartels (discussing the rise of interplatform coordination in content moderation standards).
140

Policies
and
Guidelines,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Wikipedia:Policies_and_guidelines (last visited Aug. 5, 2021) (a good example of a more
decentralized approach where community moderators collectively decide and enforce
standards).
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market incentivizes. The more complicated answer is in describing those market
incentives and acknowledging that they are driven by a complicated mix of economic,
cultural, and legal incentives, from outside the United States. Using the framework
above, I consider the types of claims that are privileged by those incentives as well as
the types of content moderation systems that it incentivizes.
A.

Speech, Personhood, and Process Claims

An examination of the evolution of content moderation (at least with larger
intermediaries) over time shows that although there was initially strong protection for
speech claims, even extralegal ones, recent developments have increasingly privileged
extralegal personhood claims. Similarly, although there were some moves toward
increased process, recent changes have largely focused on preventing harm without
regard for process claims. That may reflect a semi-permanent change, or it may merely
be the latest whims of the economic and cultural marketplace.
To return to the discussion above, although the justification of Section 230 is the
protection of legally valid speech claims from legally cognizable but invalid
personhood claims, the mechanism is not to protect the speakers directly but instead
to protect the intermediary.141 More specifically, it removes most legal incentives to
adjudicate speech, personhood, and process claims. What is left are market and
cultural incentives to choose between those competing claims. Giving intermediaries
adjudicatory power free from any legal pressure by those with personhood claims was,
for some time, the best system for speech claimants in the United States. This is
because there are virtually no legal claims available for speech claimants; they can
very rarely successfully sue to force intermediaries to keep their content posted.142
Furthermore, there are powerful cultural143 and market incentives144 to keep up
speech.
141 Keller, supra note 59, at 314.
142 Kettemann & Tiedeke, supra note 60 (comparing “must carry” claims in the United States
and Europe).
143 Klonick, supra note 35, at 1618–25 (arguing that major intermediaries, being from the
United States and being inculcated with First Amendment values, have strong cultural
incentives to be speech protective); id. at 1625–27 (arguing that intermediaries have a
contrasting sense of “corporate responsibility” to keep their users safe); cf. douek, supra note
130, at 771–72 (noting that the legal structure of Section 230 dovetailed with the major
intermediaries’ cultural values as Americans); Dvoskin, supra note 134, at 20 (citing an
interview where a pro-speech advocate described the companies in the 2000s as “‘like-minded
kind of people’ who ‘really wanted to know what we thought.’”).
144 Klonick, supra note 35, at 1627–30 (arguing that the primary motivating factor in content
moderation is monetary: “Take down too much content and you lose not only the opportunity
for interaction, but also the potential trust of users. Likewise, keeping up all content on a site
risks making users uncomfortable and losing page views and revenue.”); douek, supra note 130,
at 771 (noting that the hands-off approach was initially profitable); cf. Kate Klonick, Opinion,
Clearly, Facebook is Very Flawed. What Will We Do About It?, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 1,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/01/opinion/facebook-files-content-moderationzuckerberg.html (arguing that the disparity in per-user revenue between the United States and
the rest of the world might explain why Facebook prioritizes content moderation in the United
States).
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Empirical research on the effects of Section 230 shows that the majority of suits
barred by its immunity are defamation suits.145 It is not clear from the study how many
of the dismissed suits were valid, or even likely valid, though they were legally
cognizable insofar as plaintiffs submitted their claims in the form of a defamation
suit.146 However, Section 230 also plays some role in dismissing suits early against
intermediaries for blocking content or suspending accounts for violations of
community guidelines.147 These suits are often brought pro se,148 and the blocked
speech is usually constitutionally protected.149 This suggests that Section 230
privileges speech claims over legally cognizable—though perhaps not legally valid—
personhood claims.
Only a few years ago, there was a decent argument that market and cultural
incentives had led to the valuing of process claims. As of 2018 on major social media
platforms “almost all user-generated content that is published [was] reviewed
reactively . . . through ex post flagging by other users and review[ed] by human content
moderators against internal guidelines.”150 Klonick argued the flagging system was
not only practical, but “it serve[d] to legitimize the system when platforms are
questioned for censoring or banning content.”151 At the same time Facebook had
announced its Oversight Board,152 the civil society groups were pushing processdriven policy like the Santa Clara Principles.153 As discussed above, taking process
more seriously generally benefits speech claimants, because it makes it more “costly”
to bring a personhood claim.
Furthermore, there were high-profile cases with highly sympathetic plaintiffs
whose claims were functionally barred by Section 230. For example, Matthew Herrick
had reached out to law enforcement and received a restraining order after his exboyfriend used a fake account on Grindr to send men to (unwittingly) harass him;
Grindr (allegedly) refused to suspend the fake account, and his boyfriend was

145 See generally Elizabeth Banker, A Review of Section 230’s Meaning & Application Based
on More Than 500 Cases, INTERNET ASS’N, (July 27, 2020).
146 Id. at 7–8 (finding that in 28% of the cases where Section 230 was invoked, the courts
dismissed the claims without the aid of Section 230’s immunity—that does not directly shed
light on the merits of the cases that were dismissed).
147 Eric Goldman & Jess Miers, Online Account Terminations/Content Removals and the
Benefits of Internet Services Enforcing Their House Rules¸ 1 J. OF FREE SPEECH L. 191, 200–01
(2021).
148 Id. at 199–200.
149 Id. at 201–04.
150 Klonick, supra note 35, at 1638.
151 Id.
152 Mark Zuckerberg, A Blueprint for Content Governance and Enforcement, FACEBOOK
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/ZK5C-ZTSX (announcing the creation of the oversight
board).
153 Santa Clara Principles, supra note 126.
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(allegedly) undeterred.154 Because of Section 230, Herrick was unable to sue
Grindr.155 In a similar case in the late 1990s, Christianne Carafano was the victim of
a near-identical case of harassment, only in her case she did not know who had set up
the fake dating account that led to a torrent of harassing messages, though eventually
the dating website did take down the offending account.156 In both cases the primary
wrongdoer was unwilling to change their behavior, so barring secondary liability
against the intermediary functionally barred any liability. However, it is not clear
whether those experiences are the exception or the rule. But in general, it strongly
suggests that, at least until recently, the cultural and market incentives given free reign
by Section 230 lead to the privileging of speech claims, and to a lesser extent process,
over personhood claims.
But the recent shift has been away from speech and process claims, and toward
extralegal personhood claims. For instance, there have been a number of successful
pushes by civil society groups to change the substantive rules or enforcement of those
rules by major intermediaries to reflect extralegal personhood claims like hate
speech.157 For example, in the wake of the “GamerGate” controversy there was a
backlash against Twitter for not adopting more aggressive moderation rules, which
they eventually bowed to.158 And in the wake of the pandemic, intermediaries have
aggressively curated content.159 Smaller intermediaries have taken blatantly political

154 Carrie Goldberg, Herrick v. Grindr: Why Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act Must be Fixed, LAWFARE (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/herrick-v-grindrwhy-section-230-communications-decency-act-must-be-fixed.
155 Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 Fed. App’x. 586, 589–91 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that the
plaintiff’s product liability claims against Grindr were barred by Section 230).
156 Carafano v. Metrosplash, 339 F.3d 1119, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2003).
157 About Color of Change, COLOR OF CHANGE, https://colorofchange.org/about/ (last visited
May 2, 2021) (describing their “Tech Justice” initiatives as aimed at “[e]nding unjust practices,
racially-biased policies and inaccurate content on social media platforms”); Mike Isaac,
Facebook’s Decisions were ‘Setbacks for Civil Rights,’ Audit Finds, N. Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/technology/facebook-civil-rights-audit.html; Dvoskin,
supra note 134, at 7, 15–21 (using interviews with a mixture of civil society actors and
representatives of major internet companies, as well as anecdotal research, that companies have
consistently moved to restrict more speech over the last few years and that advocates for these
policies—what she terms “speech regulationists” are “winning”); see also Klonick, supra note
35, at 1652–53 (describing earlier debates about breastfeeding, anonymity, and nudity in art).
158 Klonick, supra note 35, at 1628–29.
159 douek, supra note 130, at 800–04 (describing the shift in moderation in response to the
pandemic); Jack Goldsmith & Andrew Keane Woods, Internet Speech will Never Go Back to
Normal,
THE ATLANTIC
(Apr.
25,
2002),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
archive/2020/04/what-covid-revealed-about-internet/610549/ (arguing that “the practices that
American tech platforms have undertaken during the pandemic represent not a break from prior
developments, but an acceleration of them”).
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stances,160 and the fallout from the “great de-platforming” in the wake of the January
6th riots continues today.161 And while commentators have noted the Facebook
Oversight Board has been generally speech-protective,162 it also has consistently
applied international human rights law that is generally a less speech-protective
approach than the First Amendment.163 Nor is this limited to hate speech and
misinformation: Twitter’s ban on political advertisements164 is a far stronger
campaign finance remedy than could be mandated under First Amendment law, and
its consumer protection policies include things like “vulgarity” and “potentially
misleading” ads that would be similarly beyond the pale if enacted by the state. 165
160 Policy: Do not Post in Support of Trump or his Administration, RAVELRY (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.ravelry.com/content/no-trump; (“Although Donald Trump is no longer President
of the United States, this policy is in effect in perpetuity.”).
161 See e.g., Ethan Zuckerman & Chand Rajendra-Nicolucci, Deplatforming Our Way to the
Alt-Tech Ecosystem, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://knightcolumbia.org/blog/deplatforming-our-way-to-the-alt-tech-ecosystem; Jen Patja
Howell, The Lawfare Podcast: Jonathan Zittrain on the Great Deplatforming, LAWFARE (Jan.
14,
2021),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-jonathan-zittrain-greatdeplatforming; Torie Bosch, Future Tense Newsletter: Welcome to the Great Deplatforming,
SLATE (Jan. 16, 2021), https://slate.com/technology/2021/01/future-tense-newsletter-greatdeplatforming.html; Genevieve Lakier, The Great Free-Speech Reveral, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
27,
2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/01/first-amendmentregulation/617827/; Danielle Keats Citron & Hany Farid, The Case for Trump’s Permanent Ban
From Social Media, SLATE (Feb. 5, 2021), https://slate.com/technology/2021/02/facebookoversight-board-trump-ban-vote.html; Ben Smith, Is an Activist’s Pricey House News?
Facebook
Alone
Decides,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
25,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/25/business/facebook-nypost.html; Gilad Edelman, On
Social Media, American-Style Free Speech is Dead, WIRED (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://www.wired.com/story/on-social-media-american-style-free-speech-is-dead/.
162 See, e.g., evelyn douek, The Facebook Oversight Board’s First Decisions: Ambitious,
and Perhaps Impractical, LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebookoversight-boards-first-decisions-ambitious-and-perhaps-impractical (noting that the first batch
of oversight decisions overturned four of five cases where Facebook took down content).
163 Id. (noting that the board applied both international human rights law and Facebook’s
own community standards in its initial cases); evelyn douek, What Type of Oversight Board
Have You Given Us?, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (May 11, 2020),
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/05/11/fb-oversight-board-edouek/ (noting that the
board will apply international human rights law); see also John Samples, Rights Against Speech,
CATO INST. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.cato.org/blog/rights-against-speech. But see Dvoskin,
supra note 134, at 49–51 (arguing that international human rights law is closer to First
Amendment doctrine and more speech protective than many platforms’ current policies).
164 Political Content, TWITTER, https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/adscontent-policies/political-content.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
165 See, e.g., Inappropriate Content, TWITTER, https://business.twitter.com/en/help/adspolicies/ads-content-policies/inappropriate-content.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2021);
Unacceptable Business Practices, TWITTER, https://business.twitter.com/en/help/adspolicies/ads-content-policies/unacceptable-business-practices.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
This also demonstrates the complicated relationship between extralegal claims that should be
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Indeed, the Board shows how legal incentives might be working to push content
moderation systems in certain directions—but they are not American legal incentives.
For some of us, that is a good thing.
And these incentives are strong: compare Reddit’s hands-off approach only six
years ago to its actions over the last year-and-a-half.166 Consider how several
“alternative” platforms in recent years are forced to quietly bow to pressures to
moderate constitutionally protected speech.167 Recall Mark Zuckerberg’s entreaties to
Congress to regulate his business.168 It does not strain the imagination to think that
Facebook wants regulation so that it does not have to subject itself to critical civil
rights audits that castigate it for not dealing with the harms of constitutionally
protected speech.169

collectively decided (stricter consumer protection policies) and those that are appropriately left
to private actors (policies against vulgarity); see also Dvoskin, supra note 134, at 32 (“In a
highly concentrated media environment, activists can ask a handful of companies to adopt the
rules that the government refuses to pass. This strategy has been an escape from the First
Amendment laissez faire doctrines.”).
166 See, e.g., Casey Newton, Reddit Bans r/The_Donald and r/ChapoTrapHouse as Part of
a Major Expansion of its Rules, THE VERGE (June 29, 2020) (citing T.C. Sottek, Reddit is a
Failed State, THE VERGE (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.theverge.com/2014/9/8/6121363/redditis-a-failed-state (criticizing Reddit for protecting people who disseminate stolen nude photos)),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/29/21304947/reddit-ban-subreddits-the-donald-chapo-traphouse-new-content-policy-rules (describing Reddit’s decision to ban prominent subreddits
entirely and contrasting them with its historically speech-protective policies); see also Dvoskin,
supra note 134, at 22–24 (finding that there is at least some causation between civil society
advocacy and specific content moderation policy changes at platforms).
167 For instance, compare Home Page, PARLER, https://parler.com/auth/access (last visited
Aug. 26, 2020) (Parler’s old home page: “Parler is an unbiased social platform . . . . We allow
free speech and do not censor ideas, political parties, or ideologies.”) with id. (Parler’s current
home page: “Speak freely and express yourself openly, without fear of being ‘deplatformed’ for
your views. Engage with real people, not bots. Parler is people and privacy-focused, and gives
you the tools you need to curate your Parler experience.”) (emphasis added). The site goes on
to brag that “we give you the tools you need to do your own ‘shadow-banning’— while still
leaving everyone else free to decide for themselves what they wish to see on their profiles and
feeds.” Id. Furthermore, it is unclear Parler ever was the Free Speech bastion it claimed to be as
it actively moderates spam, defamation, pornography, etc. Community Guidelines, PARLER,
https://legal.parler.com/documents/Elaboration-on-Guidelines.pdf (last visited May 2, 2021).
168 Paul Blumenthal & Arthur Delaney, Mark Zuckerberg is Literally Asking Congress to
Regulate Facebook, HUFFPOST (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/markzuckerberg-facebook-regulation_n_5ab400dae4b054d118e0eac5; see also Mike Masnick,
Facebook’s Nick Clegg Makes It Clear: If You’re Looking to Undermine Section 230, That’s
EXACTLY What Facebook Wants, TECHDIRT (Oct 13, 2021, 10:51 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20211013/10060247743/facebooks-nick-clegg-makes-itclear-if-youre-looking-to-undermine-section-230-thats-exactly-what-facebook-wants.shtml.
169 Laura W. Murphy & Megan Cacace, Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit, 42 (July 8, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Civil-Rights-Audit-Final-Report.pdf,
(arguing that Facebook is not doing enough to curb “hateful and harmful content”); see also
Dvoskin, supra note 134, at 26 (“[A]ppeasing public outrage may be a low-cost concession for
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That is not to say that mainstream intermediaries are the progressive bastions that
conservatives sometimes imagine them to be. The news publisher with the most
engagement on Facebook, by a healthy margin, is the Daily Wire, a conservativeslanted publication that mostly recycles mainstream journalism with new headlines or
commentary. 170 But it is not clear that anything the Daily Wire does would create
liability; for instance, a critical NPR report admits that the Daily Wire does not usually
report falsehoods,171 so it is not clear what cause of action a would-be plaintiff could
bring. As such, while Section 230 incentivizes sensationalist and biased reporting
insofar as there are market and cultural incentives for that reporting, it is not clear an
alternative system would discourage it.
Furthermore, there is evidence that these same cultural and market incentives have
driven the adoption of automated moderation systems, at least among the
intermediaries that can afford them,172 as well as broad bans on certain types of
content.173 This certainly comes at the detriment of speech claims, but also shows how
process concerns may have started to give way as well. Despite the Oversight Board’s
actions,174 and academics’ and commentators’ calls for more process, 175 it is not clear
there is broad market support for those types of claims. Even those of us who are
sympathetic to extralegal personhood claims should acknowledge that these
developments are troubling.
Finally, perhaps additional support for the idea that Section 230 privileges certain
types of extralegal personhood claims can be inferred by conservative critics of
Section 230. Pro-Section 230 commentators have mocked conservatives for
attempting to repeal Section 230 in order to prevent “censorship” of conservative
voices, pointing out that, absent Section 230, the First Amendment prevents the
government from telling intermediaries what speech to keep up or to take down.176
However, imagine a shift from a system that primarily responded to market and
cultural incentives—incentives that currently lead intermediaries to take down huge
amounts of protected speech—to a system that responded primarily, or merely more,

avoiding threats over privacy regulation and antitrust enforcement that would more directly put
the business model under pressure.”).
170 Miles Parks, Outrage as a Business Model: How Ben Shapiro is Using Facebook to Build
an Empire, NPR (July 19, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/19/1013793067/outrage-as-abusiness-model-how-ben-shapiro-is-using-facebook-to-build-an-empire.
171 Id.
172 douek, supra note 130, at 792–93.
173 See Political Content, supra note 164.
174 evelyn douek, The Oversight Board Moment You Should’ve Been Waiting for: Facebook
Responds to the First Set of Decisions, LAWFARE (Feb. 26, 2021),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/oversight-board-moment-you-shouldve-been-waiting-facebookresponds-first-set-decisions.
175 Balkin, supra note 40, at 2044–55; Zittrain, supra note 71, at 9.
176 Miers, supra note 79; see also Kettemann & Tiedeke, supra note 60 (discussing the First
Amendment protections against “must carry” claims and the related protection of “editorial
control”).
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to legal incentives to take down arguably unlawful speech. In the framework above, a
shift from privileging extralegal personhood claims, to privileging legally cognizable
personhood claims.
The impact would probably be higher for those sites with less resources; they
would have no choice but to shift a large amount of their content moderation system
toward preventing legal liability. And given that claims like hate speech and what
many would consider threats would not create legal liability, that might mean shifting
resources away from moderating that type of content. Furthermore, the suits against
intermediaries for blocking or punishing constitutionally protected (but awful) speech
might last longer and be more expensive—perhaps leading to smaller intermediaries
reinstating content and accounts rather than engaging in drawn out, if ultimately nonmeritorious, lawsuits.
A critical unanswered empirical question is the extent to which the underlying
conduct that gives rise to certain categories of extralegal personhood claims overlaps
with legally cognizable personhood claims—not necessarily valid legally cognizable
claims, but simply cognizable enough that intermediaries would take them down if
they were liable under the theory of collateral censorship. If there is significant overlap
between, say, speech that gives rise to hate speech and speech that gives rise to
defamation, the differences might not be that stark. For example, there was almost
certainly a lot of defamation on r/TheDonald before it was banned.177 Furthermore, it
is unclear if the market and cultural incentives to take down that speech would override
the legal incentive to shift content moderation resources.
Thus, at least for now, legally cognizable personhood claims—specifically, and
overwhelmingly, defamation claims—are given less weight under Section 230, while
speech claims are given more weight. And market and cultural incentives to moderate,
especially recently, have led intermediaries to privilege extralegal personhood claims,
like the harms of misinformation and hate speech, above legally valid speech claims
and process claims generally. These moves are the result of strong economic and
cultural pressures, arguably pressures that are not allowed to operate via the
democratic process because of our exceptional First Amendment jurisprudence. That
is not to say that those cultural pressures are a replacement for democratic discourse.
These shifts may not be the reflections of society, but merely those with the loudest
voices or most intense preferences and is it clear that these incentives are leading to
the correct balance between extralegal personhood claims and speech claims.178 But,

177 See, e.g., Kailtyn Tiffany, The Ultimate Conspiracy: A Conspiracy Against Reddit’s
Conspiracy
Community?,
THE
VERGE
(Jan.
11,
2017),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/11/14238636/reddit-conspiracy-theory-trump-pee-gate
(describing the pro-Trump subreddit as a “notoriously fetid troll swamp”).
178 evelyn douek, More Content Moderation is Not Always Better, WIRED (June 2, 2021),
https://www.wired.com/story/more-content-moderation-not-always-better/ (arguing that there
has not been a significant enough reckoning with the real costs of demanding speech be erased
from the internet); Dvoskin, supra note 134, at 41–46 (arguing that “speech protectionists”
advocates’ lack of success in recent years is at least partially a result of their hesitancy to
advocate for substantive policies, which in turn is driven by a grounding in First Amendment
doctrine that protects private platform’s editorial rights as well as user’s speech rights; “For
speech protectionists, the state-market divide has been paralyzing,” id. at 61).
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again, given that we are not allowed to decide these issues via the political process,
this extra-political social process is arguably as close as we can get.
B.

Section 230 and Content Moderation Beyond Rights

The effects of Section 230 do not just exist outside the rights framework; they
arguably enable intermediaries to structure themselves according to concerns outside
the rights framework. The same cultural and market incentives that lead intermediaries
to privilege extralegal personhood claims also incentivize platforms to think about the
health of online discourse, engage in legitimizing actions, work beyond the stay-up
and take-down binary, and create moderation systems completely outside the
American tradition.
Take major online intermediaries’ responses to COVID-19 misinformation.
douek,179 among others,180 has argued that the response to COVID-19 represented a
turning point in content moderation by United States online intermediaries. But that
“moderation” included not just aggressively taking content down, or even
incorporating remedies beyond the stay-up and take-down binary,181 but deciding
what content would be amplified,182 labeling content,183 and speaking themselves.184
Around the same time, Facebook also engaged in legitimizing projects, such as
Facebook’s Oversight Board and its Civil Rights Audit. That is not to say that these
legitimizing projects are enough, but that—as discussed above—they address harms
caused by constitutionally protected speech. Indeed, some of the most thoughtful
critiques of the Facebook Oversight Board argue that by limiting the “jurisdiction” of
the board, it is not allowed to pass judgment on crucial but non-adjudicatory aspects
of the content moderation system.185
There is also evidence that the cultural and economic incentives have led major
intermediaries to change their methodology as well as the claims they privilege,
moving from a categorical approach to a proportionality approach,186 at least at a high

179 douek, supra note 130, at 800–04.
180 Goldsmith & Woods, supra note 159.
181 douek, supra note 130, at 787–89.
182 See, e.g., Kang-Xing Jin, Supporting Equitable Access to COVID-19 Vaccines,
FACEBOOK (Apr. 28, 2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/04/supporting-equitable-access-tocovid-19-vaccines/.
183

Fact-Checking
on
Facebook,
FACEBOOK
(Dec.
15,
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/2593586717571940?id=673052479947730.

2020),

184 See Jin, supra note 182.
185 douek, supra note 163.
186 douek, supra note 130, at 772–75 (describing the old categorical approach that lines up
with First Amendment jurisprudence); id. at 777–84 (describing how the categorical approach
crumbled under the weight of reality as “exceptions flourished and became categories of their
own” and proportionality became more prevalent); see generally David S. Han, Transparency
in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359 (2015) (offering a less strident critique of the
“categorical” approach to the First Amendment).
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level.187 Even though the public explanation of those moves is still framed in a rightsbased discourse,188 it is completely different: it compares the rights of the speaker
against the harms of the speech generally to society, not just to a particular personhood
claimant.189 Those types of harms are not cognizable in the United States liability
system.190 Furthermore, there is evidence that some intermediaries are at least moving
to change their systems, not merely their approach or definition of harmful content.191
How content is ranked, amplified, and targeted matters a lot to us, but again, is mostly
irrelevant within the United States legal system.
It verges on blasphemous to argue that the health of public discourse is
strengthened by Section 230. But consider that some of the biggest contributors to the
“sickness” of our national discourse are not typical online intermediaries at all; they
are “mainstream media” like Fox News, Breitbart, etc.192 Consider that liability in the
United States is inherently atomistic in that it only examines the rights of the speech
and personhood claimant before it. Again, with this in mind we should take
conservative attacks on Section 230 as more intelligent than they might seem. An

187 Langvardt, supra note 105, at 294–96 (describing how Facebook moderators use a “grid”
approach to content moderation to make decisions quickly).
188 douek, supra note 130, at 810–11 (describing the disconnect between how the platforms
moderate and how they explain their decisions).
189 Id. at 784–85.
190 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–75 (1992) (“[A] plaintiff raising only
a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every
citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no
more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article
III case or controversy”).
191 See, e.g., Adi Robertson, Facebook is Expanding its Plans to Put Less Politics in the
News
Feed,
THE
VERGE
(Aug.
31,
2021),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/31/22650309/facebook-expands-political-contentreduction-tests-costa-rica-spain-sweden-ireland; evelyn douek, What Facebook Did for
Chauvin’s Trial Should Happen All the Time, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/04/facebook-should-dial-down-toxicitymuch-more-often/618653/ (arguing that Facebook’s revelation that it can prevent the spread of
posts that are likely to violate community standards during crises, thus preventing virality
without having to totally shut down speech, raises questions about what Facebook’s policies
outside crises).
192 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA 75–77 (Alex Flach &
Emma Taylor eds., 2018) (arguing that the Republican party is caught in a “propaganda
feedback loop” consisting of a partisan audience, a partisan media that gives them identityreinforcing narratives regardless of whether they are true, and politicians and elites that amass
power from participating).
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increasingly self-consciously white,193 truth-detached,194 and violent195 conservative
movement in the United States might not see a system that does not consider those
particular societal harms, or considers them less seriously, as a bad system. 196 In
contrast, those of us that take racism, misinformation, and incitement to violence as
serious societal harms should not want online intermediaries to mimic our legal
system. Readers may be skeptical that any of these developments are connected to
Section 230. However, the approach to copyright and sex work-related content
discussed below provides a stark contrast.
IV. LEGALIZING CONTENT MODERATION
Any reform of Section 230 would result in “legalizing” the content moderation
system. That is, content moderation decisions and systems would be driven by liability
rather than—primarily—cultural and economic forces. Being driven by liability
concerns, intermediaries will increasingly mimic (with important exceptions) the
substantive and procedural rules of the judicial system. I compare two approaches that
currently exist in the United States: the “comprehensive” system, exemplified by the
DMCA, and the “common law confusion” system, exemplified by SESTA-FOSTA
and the doctrine of online secondary copyright liability outside the DMCA. The
comprehensive approach seems to lead, maybe inexorably, toward privileging legally
cognizable personhood claims at the expense of all other claims. The common law
approach leads to confusion and unclear outcomes, but generally is slanted against
speech claims. Finally, I briefly address the obvious objection to a defense of Section
230: it is unique in the world. While that is true, it ignores the United States’ political
and jurisprudential exceptionalism.
A.

DMCA: A Flawed, Comprehensive System

Below, I consider the effects of the DMCA,197 which creates a comprehensive,
relatively predictable system, on the competing rights claims discussed above as well
as its effects on content moderation systems. I conclude that it mostly privileges
legally cognizable personhood (here, copyright) claims above all else, gives users
relatively little process, and homogenizes the content moderation systems.

193 See, e.g., Clare Malone, The Republican Choice, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 24, 2020),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-republican-choice/.
194 See BENKLER ET AL., supra note 192, at 75.
195 Tom Gjelten, A ‘Scary’ Survey Finding: 4 in 10 Republicans Say Political Violence May
be Necessary, NPR (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/11/966498544/a-scarysurvey-finding-4-in-10-republicans-say-political-violence-may-be-necessa.
196 Cf. Berin Szoka, Why Do Republican Senators Seem to Want to Turn Every Website into
a
Trash Heap
of
Racism
&
Abuse?,
TECHDIRT
(Sept. 30, 2020),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200929/17160745410/why-do-republican-senators-seemto-want-to-turn-every-website-into-trash-heap-racism-abuse.shtml (detailing the racist and
anti-Semitic language that pervades Parler). My simple answer to a complex question: for at
least some of them, “a trash heap of racism and abuse” is an ideal world.
197 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified in scattered section of 17 U.S.C.). This paper is only concerned with 17 U.S.C. § 512.
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Comprehensive Systems

I consider an intermediary liability system comprehensive if it allows
intermediaries to answer three critical questions. (1) Intermediaries understand
whether the regime applies to them (“Scope Requirements”), which deals with both
the substance of the claims for which it provides immunity and the types of actors to
which it applies. (2) Intermediaries understand what they have to do to comply with
the regime (“Substantive and Procedural Requirements”). (3) The consequences for
failing to comply are reasonably defined (“Remedies”). The relative predictability of
comprehensive systems means that policymakers can, with some confidence, predict
how changes to those requirements will affect process, speech, and personhood claims
because they can predict how intermediaries will react in response to those changes.
Section 230, as described above, answers all of those questions: (1) it applies to
virtually every online actor and to all civil and state criminal theories of liability, (2)
with the exceptions listed in Part II.A, it protects those actors so long as they do not
materially contribute to the illegality of the third-party content, and (3) the
consequence of non-compliance is whatever secondary liability is applicable under the
tort in question. Similarly, the DMCA, or more specifically, the safe harbor system,
creates a comprehensive system. That does not mean it creates a good system, but its
effects are different in kind than common law confusion.
As to (1) scope, substantively the DMCA’s safe harbor system deals only with
copyright. That system creates a four-part framework that apportions different safe
harbors and corresponding responsibilities to different types of online intermediaries.
These different conditions reflect the notion, discussed above, that intermediaries
“lower” or “deeper” in the stack should have less responsibility. This Part will focus
on the “Notice and Takedown” procedure (NTD)198 that applies to most social media
platforms199 and search engines.200
As to (2), substantive and procedural requirements, in the DMCA’s NTD
procedure, notice of a claim triggers certain responsibilities for the intermediary. An
intermediary is found to have notice if the personhood claimant’s complaint
(registered with a statutorily required agent) 201 complies “substantially” 202 with all
of the statutory requirements.203 Upon receiving proper notice, the intermediary, in

198 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C). The notice provision for search engines links back to the
provision for hosting services; the standards are identical. §512(d)(1), (3).
199 Id. § 512(c) (covering “Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of
Users,” which is applicable to most major social media platforms).
200 Id. § 512(d) (in the parlance of the DMCA, “Information Location Tools”).
201 Id. § 512(c)(2).
202 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ubstantial
compliance means substantial compliance with all of § 512(c)(3)'s clauses, not just some of
them”).
203 That the infringing work is identified, as well as the work it infringes upon, that there is
a “good faith” belief the use is not authorized and, under penalty of perjury, that the complaining
party is “authorized to act on behalf of the owner,” the complainant must sign the statement,
and offer enough information to “permit the service provider to locate the material,” as well as
their contact information. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi) (the perjury condition only applies to the
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order to receive immunity, must “remove, or disable access to” the content. 204 In
addition, intermediaries must have some policy to deactivate the accounts of repeat
infringers.205 Intermediaries can review the underlying substantive claim and reject it
if they believe it to be frivolous, but they lose their immunity if they are mistaken.
If they do take down the content, they must notify the speech claimant, 206 and if
they receive a valid counter-notice from the speech claimant, notify the personhood
claimant and restore access to the content in ten to fourteen days unless the personhood
claimant files in court.207 Although there is a cause of action against personhood
complainants who “knowingly materially misrepresent[] . . . that [the] material or
activity is infringing”208 the analysis is one of “good faith,” requiring only a
subjective, not reasonable, belief that the material was infringing.209 In addition, the
DMCA codifies something like “constructive notice” (that the intermediary “should
have known” about a personhood claim) by removing immunity upon “red flag”
knowledge of infringement even absent actual notice by a copyright holder, 210 but it
is limited.211 Finally, the DMCA is clear that it does not require intermediaries to
“monitor[] its service or affirmatively seek[] facts indicating infringing activity.” 212
As to (3), remedies, under the DMCA, failure to comply with the NTD procedures
leads to a loss of immunity. While a loss of immunity is a clear remedy, what that loss
means is less clear; while copyright is a strict liability offense, 213 pre-DMCA cases
gestured toward some less-than-strict liability for certain types of online services.214

requirement that the complainant is authorized to act on behalf of the owner, not that the
statement is accurate).
204 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
205 Id. § 512(i).
206 Id. § 512(g)(2)(A).
207 Id. § 512(g)(2)(B–C). There is some question as to whether this applies to search engines
at all. See Jennifer Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, UC BERKELEY PUB.
L.
RSCH.
PAPER
NO.
2755628,
132–33
(Mar.
24,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628.
208 Id. § 512(f).
209 See generally Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2015); see also
Jennifer Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or ‘Chilling Effects’? Takedown Notices
Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.
621, 629–30 (2005) (arguing that there is empirical evidence 512(f) is not an effective deterrent
in practice).
210 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
211 The consensus is that intermediary must have actual notice of facts that would make it
aware of specific infringing content, not infringing content generally. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l
Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30–32 (2d Cir. 2012).
212 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1).
213 Id. § 501.
214 Cf. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc. 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1368–71 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that the volition requirement of direct copyright
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As such, as discussed below, copyright in the absence of the DMCA looks very similar
to liability under SESTA-FOSTA, and online intermediaries go to great lengths to
ensure they do not enter it.
2.

Speech, Personhood, and Process Claims under the DMCA

Empirical research on the DMCA shows fairly convincingly that it incentivizes an
adjudicatory process where intermediaries err on the side of personhood claimants
against speech claimants and give relatively little actual process to anyone. However,
the process requirements that do exist and the cost of adjudicating individual claims
(in addition to the availability of automated personhood claims) have incentivized
alternative systems that bypass the adjudicatory process, either by creating algorithmic
processes or contracting alternative agreements with rightsholders.
As a preliminary note, the empirical research in this Part spans a relatively long
period of time. I will review the empirical data in roughly chronological order.
However, the older research, describing what is now known as the “DMCA Classic”
approach to content moderation, probably still accurately describes how many lowerrevenue sites respond to DMCA requirements. In contrast, newer research describing
the “DMCA Auto” and “DMCA Plus” approaches only applies to high-revenue sites
that can afford those processes. Thus, the older research should not be seen as
representing an older way of responding to the DMCA, but a different way. And given
the existing prevalence of automated technology in non-DMCA contexts among highrevenue intermediaries,215 it seems likely that this bifurcation would continue if
Section 230 was replaced with a DMCA-type system. Also, there is a trove of
anecdotal reports of individuals abusing the process. 216 Just as we should be wary of
anecdotal reports of abuse of Section 230, we should be wary of these as well. I will
focus on empirical research that attempts to gauge the systemic effects of the DMCA,
whether that is through sampling or experiments.
There is robust empirical evidence that the DMCA allows invalid but legally
cognizable personhood claimants to succeed on their claims. 217 There are a number

infringement is not met when for an ISP when the network is used to create copies—the court’s
holding would not affect secondary infringement or more active intermediaries).
215 See douek, supra note 130, at 792–93 (discussing the adoption of filters by major
platforms). Indeed, it seems at least plausible that major intermediaries used technological
advances that were originally spurred by the DMCA to address the increasing market and
cultural pressures to address certain extralegal personhood claims and general public health
problems.
216 See, e.g., Keller, supra note 59, at 298–99 n.28–33 (collecting commentary); see also
Takedown Hall of Shame, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/takedowns (last visited
Aug. 28, 2020) (collecting “[b]ogus copyright and trademark complaints” that threaten free
expression).
217 Mike Masnick, DMCA’s Notice and Takedown Procedure is a Total Mess, and it’s Mainly
Because
of
Bogus
Automated
Takedowns,
TECHDIRT
(Mar.
30,
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160330/01583234053/dmcas-notice-takedownprocedure-is-total-mess-mainly-because-bogus-automated-takedowns.shtml.
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of mechanisms that facilitate this.218 First, consistent with the collateral censorship
concerns that animated Section 230, there is significant “abuse” of notice systems by
users without legally valid personhood claims.219 Second, the use of notice can create
chilling effects on speech outside the specific adjudication—and deletion of user
accounts has similar effects.220 Third, counter-notifications are not used in practice to
balance the adjudicatory process.221 Finally, notice systems, along with market
pressures, might actually incentivize intermediaries to adopt filtering and blocking
systems that go beyond what the NTD system itself requires.222
To the first, NTD systems can be easily used by those with invalid personhood
claims. In a study of all notices sent to Google between March 2002 and August 2005,
and 142 self-reported notices,223 Professors Urban and Quilter found that “at least a
third of notices contain” either a legal flaw in the underlying claim or “technical
noncompliance that renders the notice unusable according to the statute”224—they did
not include notices that might be incorrect, but involved complicated questions of
law.225 Around the same time, a Brennan Center study found almost half of a set of
notices either stated weak claims or targeted speech that probably had fair use or free
expression defenses.226 At that time, most moderation at high-revenue intermediaries
was still done manually.227
Professor Seng, analyzing notices sent to Google between 2008 and 2012,228
reported a huge increase in overall notices, in part due to increasing use of automated

218 See Is the DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown System Working in the 21st Century?: Hearing
on H.R. 2281 Before Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1
(2020) (testimony of Abigail A. Rives, Intellectual Property Counsel, Engine Advocacy and
Research
Foundation),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rives%20Testimony.pdf; Urban et al., supra
note 207, at 44; Keller & Bridy, supra note 118 (arguing that both “human” and “automated”
monitoring regimes risk suppressing more legal speech than a reactive notice regime).
219 See Is the DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown System Working in the 21st Century?: Hearing
on H.R. 2281 Before Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 218.
220 See Jon Penney, Privacy and Legal Automation: The DMCA as a Case Study, 22 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 412, 446 (2020).
221 See Urban et al., supra note 207, at 44.
222 See Keller & Bridy, supra note 118.
223 Urban & Quilter, supra note 209, at 641–42.
224 Id. at 666.
225 Id. at 666–67.
226 Tricia Beckles & Marjorie Heins, Will Fair Use Survive?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 32
(Jan.
4,
2005),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201908/Report_Will%20Fair%20Use%20Survive%3F.pdf.
227 See Urban et al., supra note 207, at 31.
228 Daniel Seng, Copyrighting Copywrongs: An Empirical Analysis of Errors with
Automated DMCA Takedown Notices, SSRN RESEARCH PAPER NO. 25632023, 10 (2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2563202.
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processes, but no increase in procedurally deficient notices.229 Cataloguing
substantive errors is difficult, however, as it is difficult to measure the personhood
claimant’s work against the speech claimant’s work because the latter—pursuant to
the DMCA’s NTD system—is usually not available after the complaint is filed.230
Seng used two tests to indirectly measure the seriousness with which personhood
rights claimants were taking the system. First, Seng found that Google accepted as
valid most of the notices sent by users who were not in fact the copyright owners of
the complained of work.231 While those constituted a relatively small amount of the
total dataset studied (0.67%), Seng argues these mistakes are indicative of a blasé
approach of rightsholders toward the NTD process. 232 Similarly, Seng found that
millions of requests were sent to take down content on “MegaUpload.com” after it
had been completely shut down.233 Again, this “call[s] into question the care or
diligence of the reporters and their unqualified reliance on their automated
processes.”234 It also represents a shift as the adjudicatory process became, at least
one side, more automated.
Urban et al., looking at nearly 300,000 takedown notices for Google web searches
over a six-month period in 2013,235 found that 31% were “potentially problematic” in
that they “raised questions about compliance with statutory requirements (19.5%),
potential fair use defenses (6.6%), and subject matter inappropriate for DMCA
takedown (2.3%)” and 4.2% of the requests “targeted content that clearly did not
match the identified infringed work.”236 In a much smaller study of 3,000 notices for
Google image searches,237 they found 70% “raised substantive questions,” but the
data was skewed by a single, prolific sender who sent more than half of the notices—
taking them out, “36.3% still raised substantive issues.”238 These included 15.1%
“about the subject matter of the claim,” 11.5% raised fair use issues, 6.1% raised
questions of ownership, and 2.9% might not have “properly identified the allegedly
infringing material.”239 By the time of this study, as discussed below, at least major
platforms and rights holders had increasingly relied on automated processes. Finally,
in 2018 Professors Bar-Zib and Elkin-Koren analyzed “10,000 removal requests sent
229 Id. at 26–27. (Seng uses a slightly different taxonomy than my “substantive” and
“procedural” categories, but the differences are not relevant to this analysis).
230 Id. at 41–42.
231 Id. at 43–46.
232 Id. at 46 (“what is alarming is the magnitude, frequency, and systematic nature of these
errors, which remained undetected and the erroneous notices repeatedly recycled for months on
end”).
233 Id. at 47–54.
234 Id. at 54.
235 Urban et al., supra note 207, at 78.
236 Id. at 88.
237 Id. at 98.
238 Id. at 99.
239 Id. at 106.
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to Google Search regarding allegedly infringing materials on .il websites” (the domain
code for Israel)240 and found that 66% of notices “targeted non-infringing
materials.”241
To the effects of notices on speech other than that complained of, there is survey
evidence that users who receive DMCA notice claims do not just fail to challenge
those claims but actually self-censor their future speech to avoid future notice
claims.242 Furthermore, there is evidence that the chilling effects stem not just from
fear of uncertain legal outcomes, but from a desire to not be a lawbreaker and avoid
social stigma.243 This is somewhat backed up by empirical evidence on the effects on
Blogger and Twitter accounts that received DMCA notices. 244 Survey evidence also
suggests that chilling effect might extend to non-parties who merely become aware
that someone they know has been subject to a notice claim. 245 There is not robust
empirical evidence on deletion of user accounts, but because the DMCA’s
requirements are unclear, the policies vary widely between intermediaries.246
The DMCA was written to give at least the appearance of process for users: if
personhood claimants follow certain procedures, intermediaries must take down the
infringing content, the speech claimant can counter-notice and have their speech put
back up, and there is a cause of action against abusive reporters.247 However, the
counter-notice mechanisms are not, and have never been, effective. Although a third
of people in a survey reported that they would challenge a DMCA notice, 248 in
practice that number is far lower.249 Commentators speculate that intermediaries may
not be actually notifying users or users may not be receiving notifications that are

240 Sharon Bar-Ziv & Niva Elkin-Koren, Behind the Scenes of Online Copyright
Enforcement: Empirical Evidence on Notice & Takedown, 50 CONN. L. REV. 339, 344 (2018).
241 Id. at 376.
242 Jon Penney, Privacy and Legal Automation: The DMCA as a Case Study, 22 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 412, 446–47 (2020) (conducting a survey that showed 75% of people said they would
be less likely to “speak or write about certain topics online” and 72% said they would be less
likely to share content they created, which is almost certainly not a copyright violation); see
also J. Nathan Matias et al., Do Automated Legal Threats Reduce Freedom of Expression
Online? Preliminary Results from a Natural Experiment, CITIZENS AND TECH. LAB (2020)
https://citizensandtech.org/2020/09/chilling-effect-automated-law-enforcemen/
(accessed
February 27, 2021).
243 Penney, supra note 242, at 431–32.
244 Id. at 457 (finding that 11% of Twitter accounts and 13% of Blogger accounts receiving
DMCA notices in the study had been shut down by their users—it is unclear how this data
compares to a control group).
245 Id. at 447–48 (finding similar, but slightly less severe effects when asked the effects of a
friend receiving a DMCA notice).
246 Urban et al., supra note 207, at 46–48; Keller & Bridy, supra note 118, at 42–44.
247 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)–(g).
248 Penney, supra note 242, at 451–52.
249 Urban et al., supra note 207, at 42–46; Keller & Bridy, supra note 118, at 27–8.
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sent,250 and users may simply be intimidated.251 Furthermore, § 512(f), which gives
a cause of action against bad faith notices, has not been an effective deterrent to invalid
or extralegal claims.252 And, within the adjudicatory process, intermediaries are not
neutral parties253 and there is no transparency in their decision-making.254 Any
analysis of process should be functional, not symbolic: if speech claimants regularly
invoked, and lost, we might be satisfied from a process perspective. But the facial
differences between the notice and counter-notice, coupled with the lack of use, raise
serious process concerns.
The DMCA does not include a duty to monitor.255 However, the ability of
personhood claimants to automate the notice process has driven the intermediaries
who can afford to do so (and are actually subject to a large volume of notices) to
automate their processes in response.256 Therefore, Urban et al. has described three
contemporary responses to the DMCA’s NTD process: “DMCA Classic,” who receive
a relatively low volume of notices and manually review them with human beings and
constitute most online intermediaries, “DMCA Auto” who receive between tens of
thousands to millions of notices a year (often through automated systems) and respond
to them with automated processes, and “DMCA Plus” actors who have taken measures
that go beyond what the DMCA requires.257 Although the vast majority of
intermediaries still operate on a DMCA Classic model,258 increasing numbers of
intermediaries transition to a DMCA Auto then DMCA Plus model because “[a]t any
real volume, the [NTD] process, as written, is impossible.” 259
While a DMCA Auto approach mostly involves automatically sorting and triaging
notices and, maybe, setting up a “Trusted Sender” program for personhood claimants
with mostly valid requests, DMCA Plus practices include things like, “hash-matching
and site-wide removal,”260 “fingerprinting and filtering,”261 as well as “staydown”

250 Keller & Bridy, supra text accompanying note 118, at 29.
251 Id. at 29–30; see also Penney, supra note 242 (discussing chilling effects).
252 Urban & Quilter, supra note 209, at 629–30.
253 See, e.g., id. at 639.
254 Bar-Ziv & Elkin-Koren, supra note 240, at 384; Urban et al., supra note 207, at 115;
Urban & Quilter, supra note 209, at 623.
255 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1).
256 Urban et al., supra note 207, at 31–35; see also Keller & Bridy, supra note 118, at 33–37
(arguing that the “red flag” constructive notice standard may also be pushing intermediaries
who can afford it to adopt filtering technologies rather than risk decade-long lawsuits); but see
id. at Appendix A, 3 (arguing that DMCA Plus arrangements come from political pressure and
the threat of regulation).
257 Urban et al., supra note 207, at 29–30.
258 Id. at 73–74.
259 Id. at 54.
260 Id. at 56–57 (using hashes are to identify content identical to infringing content).
261 Id. at 57– 60 (“fingerprinting” is like hashes, but can identify slightly modified content).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss2/6

44

2022]

INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY REGULATION

245

agreements and “side agreements” with rightsholders. 262 The DMCA Auto and Plus
frameworks generally privilege personhood claims above speech claims by instituting
these practices—they “shift almost the entire burden and cost of enforcement from
copyright holders to [intermediaries].”263 And insofar as it is the cost of the NTD
procedures that drives these changes, the DMCA is driving the move toward filters,264
which, of course, offer no process to users.265
As to speech and personhood claims, while it is clear NTD privileges legally
cognizable personhood claims above speech claims, it is not clear that it privileges
valid personhood claims above invalid claims. As discussed above, a significant
percentage of invalid claims are sent to intermediaries. And yet, multiple authors have
found that there is still wide access to infringing materials. 266 Furthermore, the
existence of Rights Enforcing Organizations (REOs), third-party services that send
notices on behalf of personhood claimants, complicates this analysis because they do
not necessarily act in the personhood claimant’s interest: they are often more
aggressive and less concerned with erroneous notices.267 But all the notices, insofar
as they allege copyright harms, are addressing legally cognizable harms: a plaintiff
might try to package a privacy or fraud tort as a copyright claim, 268 but they are
packaging it as a copyright claim. Extralegal claims are simply not part of the DMCA
because it legalizes the content moderation system.
3.

The Limits of Reform

There is no shortage of suggestions for reforms to the DMCA given the research
recited above. However, considering some of the common suggestions in light of the
research demonstrates the hydraulic and counterintuitive nature of content moderation
regulation.
Most critiques operate according to the same basic logic: personhood claimant
advocates want to lower the cost of submitting notice, usually by imposing some sort

262 Id. at 60–62. See also, Keller & Bridy, supra note 118, at Appendix A, 6–22 (describing
individual instances of these types of policies in detail).
263 Keller & Bridy, supra note 118, at 17.
264 Urban & Quilter, supra note 209, at 121; cf. id. at 25–27 (arguing DMCA Plus can be a
beneficial part of the DMCA regime insofar as it is the result of market incentivizes and
therefore reflects the flexibility of the regime). But see id. at Appendix A, 3–4 (arguing that the
DMCA Plus regime is motivated by fear of regulation and creates an informal set of “minimum
standards” for the industry independent of the NTD regime).
265 See Keller, supra note 118.
266 See, e.g., Bar-Ziv & Elkin-Koren, supra note 240, at 378–79; Urban et al., supra note
207, at 119 (acknowledging that the NTD is not effective at stopping “large-scale, off-shore
infringement”).
267 Urban et al., supra note 207, at 41–42.
268 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 736–38 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (the plaintiff
believed she was playing a bit part in a “an action-adventure thriller” but was actually cast in
an Islamophobic film and had her innocuous lines dubbed over with the line “Is your
Mohammed a child molester?” leading to death threats).
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of filter or monitoring obligation that would make notice unnecessary, 269 while speech
claimant advocates want to increase the cost of submitting notice and decrease the cost
of counter notice.270 And there is experimental evidence that increasing the cost of
sending notices will “balance” speech and personhood claims (but only involving a
neutral third-party arbiter actually privileges valid personhood claims).271 That is,
increasing costs on either side privileges speech and personhood claims generally,
rather than increasing the accuracy of the intermediary.272 The second common
critique is that there should be more transparency in decision-making so that we can
collectively criticize those decisions.273
The first problem, again, is whether legalizing content moderation systems is a
good idea. In the copyright context, perhaps there is a tight fit between illegal and
unwanted content; that is, there are relatively few instances where extralegal plaintiffs
are normatively sympathetic274 and there are plenty who are not.275 But again, in the
United States, it is not clear that we would want to absolutely maximize legally
cognizable personhood claims at the expense of extralegal claims—insofar as
legalizing the moderation process might lead to fewer resources devoted towards those
extralegal harms.

269 See Urban et al., supra note 207, at 140 (arguing against these proposed changes).
270 See, e.g., id. at 128–31 (arguing that the perjury requirement to the entire notice, allow
“immediate putback in response to a valid counter notice,” change § 512(f) from a subjective to
a “reckless” standard, allow speech claimants to recover statutory damages, and reform statutory
damages so they are not so punitive); Keller & Bridy, supra note 118, at 24–25 (arguing that
the DMCA should be amended to give more notice to the user, including content taken down in
“red flag” situations, counter-notice should be easier, § 512(f) should be harder for reporters to
ignore, there should be more transparency, standards for REO’s should be created, and there
should be consequences for “bulk or robo-sourced removal requests with a high error rate”);
Seng, supra note 228, at 57–60 (arguing that the perjury requirement should be expanded to the
entire notice, the reporter should be required to actually try the URI, and reporters who
consistently issue procedurally faulty requests should be penalized).
271 Lenka Fiala & Martin Husovec, Using Experimental Evidence to Design Optimal Notice
and Takedown Process, TILE DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2018-028 17–23 (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3218286.
272 Id. We might imagine that increasing the cost would weed out invalid or extralegal claims,
but it seems at least as likely that it would merely weed out less wealth users regardless of the
validity of their underlying claim.
273 See, e.g., Keller, supra note 59, at 335; see also douek, supra note 130, at 821–25.
274 See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 736–38 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(explaining that the plaintiff believed she was playing a bit part in a “an action-adventure
thriller” but was actually cast in an Islamophobic film and had her innocuous lines dubbed over
with the line “Is your Mohammed a child molester?” leading to death threats).
275 See, e.g., Access Denied: How Journalists and Civil Society Can Respond to Content
Takedown Notices, ARTICLE 19 & CYBERLAW CLINIC, 18–36 (Dec. 3, 2020) (cataloguing
numerous examples across South American countries where the DMCA was used against
journalists on to silence unwanted coverage of certain topics or positions).
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The second problem is the counterintuitive, hydraulic nature of trying to privilege
certain claims. There is evidence that it is the cost of notice regimes that leads
intermediaries to take measures beyond notice, at least when they can afford to do so,
or to simply not use the system at all.276 Not all reforms would increase costs to
intermediaries—for instance, lowering statutory damages in the context of the DMCA
would lower the costs for intermediaries. But reforms that focus on improving counter
notice make the regime more costly for intermediaries, arguably nudging them more
toward less speech-protective solutions, counter to the reformers’ intentions.
A similar problem threatens to undermine process reforms. It would seem that
there would be a straightforward positive correlation between more procedural
requirements and increased process in an intermediary liability system. There might
be some exceptions: short time limits might decrease process by rushing an
adjudication. But generally, the more requirements for users to be equally involved in
the process, or the more the intermediary is nudged into being impartial, the better
process there should be. However, as with speech claims, at a certain point raising the
costs of adjudication on intermediaries will incentivize them to avoid the adjudication
entirely via ex ante moderation techniques—which, by definition, are the worst
approaches to moderation from a process frame. It is not clear where that point is, and
it is almost certainly different both over time (depending on the cost and accuracy of
ex ante moderation tools) and for different types of intermediaries, but it exists.
Although it is largely hypothetical at this point,277 we could try to avoid this by forcing
intermediaries to give users some process in all instances of content removal or we
could leave the adjudication to the courts.278
But again, process interacts with rights. The DMCA system legalizes the content
moderation system and forces complainants (probably rightfully) to frame their harms
in terms of copyright; those types of process requirements privilege legally cognizable
personhood claims over extralegal ones. And we cannot, by definition, leave
extralegal personhood claims to the courts. If we want disputes involving extralegal
personhood claims to have some process, they will have to be incentivized in private
adjudications by requiring process without reference to the underlying claim. But in
private adjudications, increasing process functionally means privileging speech claims
against the relevant personhood claims given that a default notice system is probably

276 Jack Lerner, Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability and User-Generated Content in
the United States, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY, 360–61 (Giancarlo
Frosio ed., 2020) (describing how the difficulty of compliance with the DMCA leads some
intermediaries to not raise it as a defense in litigation—Urban et al.’s research suggests that use
of the DMCA procedures is widespread, but perhaps it is as a way to stave off litigation, rather
than actually win it).
277 But see PACT Act, S. 797, 117th Cong. § 5 (2021).
278 See, e.g., Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c 20, 41.25(2)(a–f) (Can.) (showing
in Canada, certain intermediaries are subject to a “Notice and Notice” system where their
primary responsibility is to send a notice from the personhood complainant to the speaker and
retain identifying information assisting the complainant should they decide to institute a lawsuit
and are under no obligation to take down the content absent a court order).
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slanted against speech claimants.279 That is not to say that any of these moves are
wrong, only that they are complex and dynamic.
4.

The DMCA Beyond Rights

We can also look beyond the rights framework to the effects of the DMCA by
thinking about its effects on online discourse, legitimacy, and the types of content
moderation it incentivizes, and extrapolating the effects of a DMCA-type system
outside copyright. While its overall effects are mixed, it seems to have the effect of
homogenizing the content moderation processes. We might be okay with a
homogenous copyright regime, but a homogeneous content moderation regime seems
harder to justify—especially one that mimics United States jurisprudence.
There is evidence that the use of notices is not evenly distributed; the notices from
the DMCA tend to be sent by either professional reporters who use automated
processes280 or very motivated individuals.281 It seems at least plausible that an
extension of liability would similarly be dominated by powerful or at least the most
motivated actors—especially considering that defamation law in the United States is
already used in that fashion.282 That, in turn, raises serious concerns about the
legitimacy of such a system (and the legitimacy of the DMCA). Even though there are
no formal holders of defamation rights, for example, there are public actors who are
especially likely to institute the suits (and have the money to back up their threats) and
might collectively pressure intermediaries to regulate content or face liability.
Further undermining the legitimacy of such a system is the lack of a necessary
connection between process and legitimacy. Advocates for process largely press for
changes within the adjudicatory framework.283 But Facebook alone moderates,
according to some estimates, twenty million “cases” every day—a traditional appeals
process, for instance, is neither realistic284 nor does it guarantee actual oversight.285

279 Without questioning their genuine passion for due process, it is not a coincidence that
both the Manilla Principles and Santa Clara Principles, which focus on questions of process, are
endorsed mainly by Free Expression organizations. Supra note 126; see also Dvoskin, supra
note 134, at 46–47 (finding that most “speech protectionists” advocacy organizations focus on
supporting procedural policies rather than substantive ones).
280 See, e.g., Urban et al., supra note 207, at 82–84 (describing prevalence of professional
REO’s in Google Web Search Study); Daniel Seng, The State of the Discordant Union: An
Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 369, 392–94 (2014)
(finding that notices are dominated by established publishers).
281 See, e.g., Bar-Ziv & Elkin-Koren, supra note 240, at 377 (finding a huge number of the
notices were sent by a single user); Urban et al., supra note 207, at 99–100 (finding a single
person sent over half the requests in their Google Image Search Study).
282 See, e.g., supra note 67 (discussing the abuse of defamation in the United States by
powerful actors, both historically and in the present).
283 Niva Elkin-Koren & Maayan Perel, Guarding the Guardians: Content Moderation by
Online Intermediaries and the Rule of Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY
LIABILITY 670–73 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020).
284 Langvardt, supra note 105, at 293.
285 Id. at 298–99.
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Process requirements may well be good, but they do not guarantee legitimacy: for that,
we need to think outside the adjudicatory framework to alternative models of
oversight.286
Despite these legitimacy concerns, there is also evidence that the comprehensive
system created by the DMCA allowed for the flourishing of online intermediaries, in
contrast to the “common law confusion” described below.287 Indeed, the passage of
the DMCA was in part spurred by the fear of uncertainty that common law
development would create.288 Although many commentators argue that “the internet”
is no longer young and therefore no longer needs protecting,289 it is not clear from the
analysis above that liability would primarily affect the large intermediaries that, in
both the copyright and non-copyright fields, have shifted to automated ex ante
moderation systems. Instead, research shows that the adoption of those systems can
have an anti-competitive effect;290 creating a liability regime with which only they
can comply will only make that worse. Thus, insofar as a heterogenous internet is
desirable, a comprehensive system seems preferable.
And a comprehensive system can still have homogenizing effects, even if it allows
a diversity of actors. For instance, the DMCA works entirely within the stay-up and
take-down binary. Intermediaries do not get credit under the law for de-amplifying
content, labelling it, etc. They are allowed to keep the safe harbor when they remove
content and ban repeat offenders. Thus, their content moderation reflects that binary.
And that goes to the methodology employed as well. Under “DMCA Classic” there
is a mimicking of the legal adjudication process: intermediaries use the type of legal
reasoning that a court would use to determine whether there is a valid personhood
(copyright) claim. As discussed above, it is not a fair adjudication, as it is private and
the legal incentives are slanted toward the personhood claimant, but it makes sense
that these actors are attempting to mimic United States courts. And because the DMCA
requires companies to create an agent that rightsholders can send notice to, 291
moderation systems are incentivized to become centralized—at least for the narrow
purposes of DMCA compliance.292
In contrast, under “DMCA Auto” and “DMCA Plus,” we see automated processes
and contracting with third parties in an effort to make the process more efficient and
avoid individual adjudications altogether, but those efforts are still aimed at unlawful
content. There is some variation, but it revolves around avoiding liability instead of
non-liability concerns like legitimacy or public health. A comprehensive system that

286 See supra notes 135–38.
287 Keller & Bridy, supra note 118, at 8–9, 44 (collecting commentary).
288 See, e.g., Urban & Quilter, supra note 209, at 631.
289 See, e.g., Citron & Wittes, supra note 7, at 410.
290 Urban et al., supra note 207, at 64–65.
291 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
292 See, e.g., The Wikimedia Foundation Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Policy,
WIKIMEDIA FOUND. https://foundation.wikimedia.org/wiki/DMCA_Policy (last visited Sept. 2,
2021) (describing a centralized content moderation approach that contrasts with the normal,
community-based approach for most of the Wikimedia Foundation’s projects).
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legalized content moderation in the United States would not be the panacea that
reformers imagine. Scrapping our existing system would be even worse.
B.

SESTA-FOSTA and Secondary Copyright Liability: Common Law
Confusion

A recent exception to our comprehensive liability system was the passage of
SESTA-FOSTA in 2018, creating a carveout for “prostitution” and sex-trafficking as
well as substantive changes to prostitution and sex trafficking laws. 293 An older, less
commented on exception is the secondary copyright liability for those online
intermediaries who cannot or choose not to avail themselves of DMCA’s safe
harbor.294 The content moderation moves by intermediaries in the absence of a
comprehensive regime are strikingly similar despite being from disparate areas of law:
they engage in aggressive filtering and blocking of any potentially unlawful speech.
Furthermore, when looking at the effects of these legal regimes, we should keep in
mind that they both operate in the shadow of a more comprehensive regime, limiting
the effect of these exceptions on the overall internet. Instead, we should expect that if
a similar approach was expanded, the effects that are currently relegated to a subset of
the internet would be felt by the internet at large.
1.

The Law of SESTA-FOSTA

After briefly addressing the legal changes caused by SESTA-FOSTA, I conduct a
brief survey of recent decisions involving SESTA-FOSTA. This survey shows that it
has created an intermediary liability system that offers online intermediaries virtually
no answers to the three questions articulated above: (1) who is liable for which types
of claims, (2) what the requirements are for compliance, and (3) what remedies are
possible due to non-compliance. However, this is a survey; anyone interested in a
comprehensive discussion of the precise legal changes SESTA-FOSTA enacted
should refer to Kendra Albert et al.’s recent piece.295
SESTA-FOSTA’s legal effects include a mixture of civil and criminal changes,
including eliminating immunity for some federal civil sex-trafficking claims.296 But
courts have struggled with what those changes mean. The first problem is scope—
what substantive law applies. The law creates a new cause of action, 18 U.S.C. §
2421A, which creates liability for anyone who “owns, manages, or operates an
interactive computer service” who “(1) promotes or facilitates the prostitution of 5 or
more persons; or (2) acts in reckless disregard of the fact that such conduct contributed
to sex trafficking, in violation of 1591(a) . . . .” However, the law only excepts from
Section 230 immunity an existing and different cause of action, 18 U.S.C. § 1595,297
and further limits the exception to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. This has created
293 FOSTA-SESTA Was Supposed to Thwart Sex Trafficking. Instead, it’s Sparked a
Movement, THE PULSE RADIO (July 10, 2020) (downloaded using Apple Podcasts).
294 Lerner, supra note 276, at 350–51 (explaining that courts have developed vicarious
infringement and contributory infringement as two doctrines of secondary liability).
295 Albert et al., supra note 32.
296 See id.
297 Which creates a general cause of action for all victims of violations of 18 U.S.C. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421A, 1595, 1591.
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confusion in the few district courts to entertain civil suits based on these provisions.
Some courts have taken the position “FOSTA-SESTA” claims are still barred by
Section 230298—these courts must mean § 2421A claims. Others have taken the
position that claims based on § 2421A are not immunized by Section 230, but state
civil claims are preempted, even if they are identical to § 2421A.299 In other words,
courts are not sure what even falls in or outside of the carveout.
The second problem is unclear compliance requirements. Liability within the
carveout is still being articulated by the courts. In the absence of Section 230,
commentators agree that courts would likely impose some requirement of actual or
constructive knowledge, either via constitutional implication or statutory
interpretation, but the substance of those requirements is far from clear. 300 Recent
cases have seen courts impose heightened scienter requirements, 301 but the contours
are not clear. That confusion is exacerbated by the small number of civil or criminal
suits that have been brought after SESTA-FOSTA was passed,302 as well as the
volume of frivolous complaints.303

298 Morton v. Twitter, Inc., No. CV 20-10434-GW-JEMx, 2021 WL 1181753, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. 2020) (holding that Section 230 categorically bars “SESTA-FOSTA” claims without
additional analysis); cf. M.L. v. craigslist Inc., No. C19-6153, 2020 WL 5494903, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. 2020) (arguing, dicta, that only claims of conduct that violates § 1591 and brought under
§ 1595 are exempt from a Section 230 immunity defense, which would not include claims
brought under § 2421A).
299 See, e.g., J.B. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 19-cv-07848-HSG, 2020 WL 4901196, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. 2020) (holding that SESTA-FOSTA only created a federal civil carveout).
300 See generally, Jeff Kosseff, First Amendment Protection for Online Platforms, 35
COMPUT. L. & SCI. REV. 199, 203–05 (2019) (arguing that the scienter requirements for tort
liability could be quite loose, reviewing obscenity cases where the court allowed “constructive
knowledge” liability—that is, negligence). Contra Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule,
131 HARV. L. REV. 2027 (2018) (arguing that Section 230’s immunity for intermediaries is
required by First Amendment doctrine).
301 United States v. Martono, No. 3:20-CR-00274-N-1, 2021 WL 39584, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
2021) (arguing that there was an implied “intent” requirement under s 2421A); see also Doe v.
Kik Interactive, Inc., 482 F. Supp.3d 1242, 1249–51 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (similarly imputing a
heightened scienter requirement in a § 1595 case, arguing the heightened scienter of § 1591
applied).
302 Albert et al., supra note 32, at 1110–14.
303 See, e.g., Brooks v. Delaney, No. 4:20-40148-TSH, 2021 WL 1092135, at *2 (D. Mass.
2021) (bringing a claim under § 2421A with nothing but conclusory allegations); Brooks v.
Love, No. 4:20-40148-TSH, 2021 WL 1092634, at *2 (D. Mass. 2021); Brooks v. Gilman, No.
4:20-40148-TSH, 2021 WL 1092640, at *2 (D. Mass. 2021); Brooks v. D’Errico, No. 4:2040148-TSH, 2021 WL 1092644, at *2–3 (D. Mass. 2021); Green v. YouTube, LLC, No. 18-cv203-PB, 2019 WL 1428890, at *5 (D.N.H. 2019) (holding that claims by a plaintiff who is
“battling” sex trafficking has nothing to do with SESTA-FOSTA); Igbonwa v. Facebook, Inc.,
No. 18-cv-02027-JCS, 2018 WL 4907632, at *7 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (holding that SESTAFOSTA only deals with sex trafficking claims); DeLima v. YouTube, LLC, No. 17-cv-733-PB,
2018 WL 4473551, at *6 (D.N.H. 2018) (holding that claims by a plaintiff who is “battling” sex
trafficking has nothing to do with SESTA-FOSTA).
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Finally, because of the lack of case law, no one is sure what remedies (damages)
will look like, though damages can be quite large in trafficking cases.304 For now,
there is evidence that exacting a less-than-comprehensive scheme will mostly lead to
legal confusion.305
2.

The Law of Online Secondary Copyright Liability

Outside the safe harbor system created by the DMCA, the law of online secondary
copyright liability has parallels to SESTA-FOSTA’s unclear standards. Although the
(1) scope is clear insofar as it applies to all online providers and to copyright
violations, both (2) compliance and (3) remedies are far less clear. Despite a general
consensus that scienter requirements should be increased as compared to offline
secondary copyright liability, this court-made doctrine fails to offer a comprehensive
system.
As to compliance, there are two theories of secondary copyright liability:
contributory liability and vicarious liability. Contributory liability occurs when an
intermediary, “with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”306 The knowledge standard is
probably easy to meet online.307 However, whereas the contribution standard offline
is met by merely providing facilities, 308 online it seems to require either a failure to
institute “simple measures”309 or the act of inducing infringement.310 Vicarious
304 See, e.g., Court Upholds $10 Million Judgment Against Bolivian Leaders for 2003
Massacre, INT’L HUM. RTS. CLINIC BLOG (Apr. 6, 2021), https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/pressreleases/court-upholds-10-million-judgment-against-bolivian-leaders-for-2003-massacre;
Lorene D. Park, $3M Verdict Stands Against US Embassy Worker for Role in Husband’s Sex
Abuse
of
Housekeeper,
WOLTERS
KLUWER
(Mar.
1,
2019),
https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/news/employment-law-daily/3m-verdict-stands-against-usembassy-worker-for-role-in-husband-s-sex-abuse-of-housekeeper/74307/.
305 See Albert et al., supra note 32, at 1157–58 (concluding the statute’s meaning is unclear,
probably ineffective, but comes at a very real human cost to sex workers); cf. Woodhull
Freedom Found. v. United States, 948 F.3d 363, 374–76 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Katsas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing against the plaintiffs’ broad construction of §
2421A, but holding that it still touches upon enough of their activities to establish standing).
306 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Gershwin
Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc. 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
307 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa, 494 F.3d 788, 795 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the
standards for notice are almost certainly less stringent than the procedural requirements in the
DMCA).
308 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (holding that “the provision of space, utilities, parking,
advertising, plumbing, and customers” satisfies this prong).
309 Visa, 494 F.3d at 796 (holding that credit card companies have no “direct connection” to
the infringement); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171–72 (9th Cir.
2007); cf. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding an ISP is liable if it has actual knowledge of infringement and
fails to take it down).
310 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005) (“[O]ne who
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
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liability requires a direct benefit from infringement and control over the infringers.311
Courts have raised the online standard for the control prong somewhat. 312 Even so,
these increased standards are both unclear and might be of little use for many online
intermediaries,313 meaning they could be secondarily liable for a lot of the
infringement on their services. Furthermore, United States copyright law calculates
statutory damages per infringement, leading to potentially enormous damages for
secondary liability.314
3.

The Effects of SESTA-FOSTA and Online Secondary Copyright Liability
on Rights

In response to both SESTA-FOSTA and secondary copyright liability,
intermediaries react by taking extremely aggressive measures against any speech that
could give rise to legally cognizable personhood claims. 315 Apart from being bad for
speech claimants, the aggressive measures give no users process and have haphazard
effects at best on personhood claims. The similarity of the intermediaries’ reactions in
these disparate areas of law suggests that this is a likely reaction to a loss of immunity
in the United States.316
There are three caveats to the following analysis. First, although the supporters of
SESTA-FOSTA took credit for the shutdown of Backpage, it was shut down five days
before the law was passed in response to a federal criminal investigation.317 Because

expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts
of infringement by third parties.”); Visa, 494 F.3d at 795–96 (conceptualizing inducement as an
alternative to “material contribution” test).
311 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262.
312 Visa, 494 F.3d at 805 (holding that an ability to put “indirect economic pressure rather
than an affirmative exercise of contractual rights” cannot satisfy the control requirement);
Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1173–74 (holding that the contractual relationships of Google with the
infringers was not enough to satisfy this prong because it would not prevent them from posting
infringing content); cf. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262–63 (holding that the “broad contract” allowed
them to control the vendors—but citing precedent that a contract was not necessary).
313 Facebook or YouTube, for example, have very discrete and near-absolute control over
their user’s content. See Vera Eidelman, et al., Time and Again, Social Media Giants Get
Content Moderation Wrong: Silencing Speech about Al-Aqsa Mosque is Just the Latest
Example, ACLU (May 17, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/news/free-speech/time-and-againsocial-media-giants-get-content-moderation-wrong-silencing-speech-about-al-aqsa-mosqueis-just-the-latest-example.
314 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
315 See infra notes 321, 328, at 5.
316 Id.
317 Danielle Blunt & Ariel Wolf, Erased: The Impact of FOSTA-SESTA & the Removal of
Backpage, HACKING//HUSTLING, 4 (2020), https://hackinghustling.org/erased-the-impact-offosta-sesta-2020; Sarah Lynch and Lisa Lambert, Sex Ads Website Backpage Shut Down by U.S.
Authorities, THOMSON REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usabackpage-justice/sex-ads-website-backpage-shut-down-by-u-s-authorities-
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the shutdown of Backpage cannot be linked directly to SESTA-FOSTA, and because
the shutdown of Backpage was so integral to many of the sex workers surveyed,318 a
one-to-one link cannot be established between the passage of SESTA-FOSTA and the
effects on sex workers. Second, the sample sizes are small,319 but given practical
constraints on collecting data they are still useful. Finally, both the SESTA-FOSTA
and secondary copyright liability case studies involve a mixture of civil and criminal
law; thus, it is difficult to disentangle the intermediaries’ responses from those
disparate enforcement mechanisms.
As to SESTA-FOSTA, we know that sites shut down certain parts of their site in
anticipation of the law,320 and at least one site has been shut down on the basis of its
new criminal provisions.321 And we know that sex workers have had difficulty
reaching clients after those shutdowns.322 There is anecdotal evidence that, in the
wake of SESTA-FOSTA, intermediaries are more aggressively delisting
(“shadowbanning”) sex workers’ social media accounts even when they are not
engaged in sex-work related speech, though the intermediaries deny it.323 Immediately
following the law’s passage, Craigslist took down its personal ads and specifically
acknowledged SESTA-FOSTA as the reason,324 but other sites have quietly taken
down or tightened their policies around “adults only” content. 325

idUSKCN1HD2QP; Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017,
Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (Apr. 11, 2018).
318 Blunt & Wolf, supra note 317, at 19 (finding 40% of online sex workers found over half
their clients on Backpage).
319 Id. at 5–7; Danielle Blunt et al., Posting into the Void, HACKING//HUSTLING, 27–29
(2020), https://hackinghustling.org/posting-into-the-void-content-moderation/.
320
Documenting
Tech
Actions,
SURVIVORS
AGAINST
https://survivorsagainstsesta.org/documentation/ (last visited May 3, 2021).

SESTA,

321 Press Release: DOJ Uses New Criminal Penalties to Seize Cityxguide.com,
HACKING//HUSTLING (June 23, 2020), https://hackinghustling.org/press-release-doj-uses-newcriminal-penalties-to-seize-cityxguide-com/.
322 Blunt & Wolf, supra note 317, at 19 (finding 80.61% of online respondents are facing
difficulty advertising for clients).
323 See generally Blunt et al., supra note 319.
324 FOSTA, CRAIGSLIST, https://www.craigslist.org/about/FOSTA (last visited May 2, 2021)
(explaining that, in the wake of SESTA-FOSTA, it could not risk running a classified section).
325 Jesse Dorris, The Queer Past Gets Deleted on eBay, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 27, 2021),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-queer-past-gets-deleted-on-ebay
(reporting that after the passage of the act, “Tumblr banned sexual content, Facebook prohibited
the formation of groups organized around sexual encounters, and Instagram ramped up its
policing of user content, especially that which includes any hint of human nudity,” and eBay
“banned the sale of ‘sexually oriented materials’”).
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Compare this with the effects of secondary liability on those actors outside the
DMCA’s safe harbor. After the 2012 takedown of “Megaupload.com”326 for criminal
violations, the MPAA reported in a letter to the USTR:
[M]any linking websites, custom search engines, and custom streaming
scripts . . . became inoperable. Some websites were abandoned by their
operators, others lost traffic, while still others shifted their business model . .
. . Affiliate programs that paid uploaders for their content were also
discontinued or removed by many hubs. Further, infringing content was
purged by operators in bulk, which was followed by uploaders who deleted
their own files to prevent the hubs from profiting on the uploads without
paying incentives. In sum, the impact of the seizures was massive and hub
landscape is still recovering. 327
The MPAA concluded its letter with a list of other “notorious markets,” 328 a
number of which have since been taken down.329 Furthermore, there is some evidence
that websites operating within the DMCA’s safe harbor took steps to limit their
association with these types of sites, deleting or delisting links. 330 In both instances,
there were site-wide and content-based shutdowns and aggressive, proactive
moderation associated with any content that might give rise to liability. 331
These are some of the worst responses from a speech claimant’s perspective. Nor,
though this is beside the point from the perspective of the authors of the survey of sex
workers, is all the speech unlawful: sex work lies on a fuzzy spectrum of lawful to
criminal.332 Similarly, though infringement was rampant on many of the torrenting

326 Megaupload File-Sharing Site Shut
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-16642369.

Down,

BBC

(Mar.

8,

2012),

327 Letter from Michael P. O’Leary, Senior Exec. Vice President, Motion Picture Ass’n of
Am., to Stan McCoy, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative, Off. of U.S. Trade Representative,
5 (Sept. 14, 2012) https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/529366/115644694-notmotion-picture-association-of.pdf [hereinafter “MPAA Letter”].
328 See generally id.
329 isoHunt Shut Down, Canadian Torrent Firm Fined $110M US, CANADIAN BROAD. CORP.
(Oct. 13, 2013), https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/isohunt-shut-down-canadian-torrent-firmfined-110m-us-1.2126064; Aaron Brown, ExtraTorrent is BACK, But You Might Not Want to
Trust the Return of this Torrent Site, EXPRESS (May 31, 2017), https://www.express.co.uk/lifestyle/science-technology/810254/ExtraTorrent-CC-Proxy-Mirror-Back;
Nick
Statt,
KickassTorrents Domains Seized After Alleged Owner is Arrested in Poland, THE VERGE (July
20, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/7/20/12243592/kickass-torrents-artem-vaulinfounder-arrested-domains-seized; Ernesto Van der Sar, Torrentz Shuts Down, Largest Torrent
Meta-Search
Engine
Says
Farewell,
TORRENFREAK
(Aug.
5,
2016),
https://torrentfreak.com/torrentz-shuts-down-largest-torrent-meta-search-engine-saysfarewell-160805/.
330 Seng, supra note 228, at 47–48.
331 See MPAA Letter, supra note 327, at 5.
332 See, e.g., Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 234 (7th Cir. 2015) (pointing out
“[not] everything in the adult section of Backpage's website is criminal, violent, or exploitive”).
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sites referenced above, there was a significant minority of non-infringing speech.333
The effect on specific types of personhood claims is harder to parse: because these
tools are so blunt, they affect valid, invalid, and extralegal personhood claims, but it
is not clear they do so in any predictable way. Maybe they divert content moderation
resources toward legally cognizable personhood claims away from extralegal
personhood claims, but even that is not clear because they are so overbroad. And as
discussed above, they are also one of the worst responses from a process perspective
because they take down speech with next to no notification, explanation, or
participation for users, and the broadness is not justified by the harm, but by the mere
possibility of legal liability—intermediaries are not acting as a neutral third-party.
Finally, as discussed in more detail below, there is no reason to think that the effects
of a “common law confusion” regime—unclear scope, compliance, and remedies—
would not have similar effects if introduced to new areas of law. We should expect a
haphazard privileging of legally cognizable personhood claims at the expense of all
other rights claims.
4.

The Effects of SESTA-FOSTA and Online Secondary Copyright Liability
Beyond Rights

Finally, looking outside the adjudicatory frame is helpful. First, rather than
thinking in terms of adjudications of speech and harm, we can think about it in far
more direct terms—the health of the people it affects. Research on those effects shows
the disparate impact of the changes and raises questions about the applicability of the
traditional adjudicatory framework in the context of sex work at all. Indeed, this
becomes clearer when compared with copyright, where there are clearer distinctions
between different types of rights holders. Finally, both SESTA-FOSTA and online
secondary copyright liability are examples of intermediary liability regimes in the
shadow of a more comprehensive regime; the lack of effects outside their substantive
area can be chalked up to the relative predictability created by Section 230 and the
DMCA. That these effects may be narrowly distributed should not be comforting
given that many reformers want to dismantle the larger system that provides
predictability.
Evidence shows that aggressive content moderation in the wake of SESTAFOSTA “played a role in the increased economic instability for 72.45% of the online
participants of this survey, with 33.8% reporting an increase of violence from clients,”
while “23.71% of online workers reported that their housing situation has changed
since April 2018” and 99% “reported that this law does not make them feel safer.”334
That all goes to questions of legitimacy: the point of the law, as reflected in its title,
was to prevent sex-trafficking. If it is making sex traffickers more prone to violence,
it is not doing what it said it would do. The research also helps challenge rights
framework, at least in this context.

333 See, e.g., MPAA Letter, supra note 327, at 6 (acknowledging that there is non-infringing
work on these sites); see also MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 952 (2005)
(finding that, according to the plaintiff’s own expert, approximately 10% of the files on Grokster
were non-infringing).
334 Blunt & Wolf, supra note 317, at 18.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss2/6

56

2022]

INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY REGULATION

257

Many sex work advocacy groups argue that the sex worker/survivor binary is a
false one.335 In other words, the speech claimant (sex worker) is often the same person
as the personhood claimant (trafficking victim). That the personhood and speech
claims here are difficult to disentangle is a good reason to not use intermediary liability
to address this particular issue because intermediary liability depends on those two
groups being relatively distinct, at least within an individual claim. Similarly, looking
at the collateral content that is taken down challenges the speech/personhood binary.
The tightening of policies on “adults only” content tends to disproportionately affect
LGTBQ users;336 moving out of the adjudicatory frame, the policy itself could be seen
as an anti-LGTBQ policy, not just an anti-speech policy.
In contrast, copyright offers a regime where speech and personhood claimants can
usually be separated, and therefore there might be a better reason to use a harsher
intermediary liability system. But only if you think copyright infringers are
lawbreakers that deserve to be driven off the internet; in contrast, there is a relatively
flourishing “pirate”337 movement and less extreme Copyleft movement338 that saw
the changes after the Napster, Grokster, and MegaUpload cases as disasters in terms
quite similar to advocates for sex workers.339 And for some, it is likely SESTAFOSTA “is working exactly as intended: deeming communities as high-risk and
deserving of removal from public spaces.”340 This is not to draw a moral equivalence
between the harms visited on each group, but rather to show the parallel effects given
similar regimes.
Finally, both regimes have developed (mostly) in the shadow of a comprehensive
system of liability: Section 230 and the DMCA. That the internet has not “broken”
after SESTA-FOSTA is not proof that Section 230 is not important to the internet: it
is proof that it is. Without diminishing the impact of SESTA-FOSTA on the sexworker community, nor the possibility its effects are a “test-run” for the general
population,341 for most non-sex workers or those on the periphery of that category,
335 See, e.g., Blunt et al., supra note 319, at 68; see also Blunt & Wolf, supra note 317, at
15–16 (discussing the complexities of self-identification as a “survivor” or “victim”).
336 Dorris, supra note 325.
337 See, e.g., PIRATE PARTIES INT’L, https://pp-international.net/pirate-parties/ (last visited
May 3, 2021); see also Anna Margrét Björnsson, Almost Half of Icelandic Nation Now the
Pirate
Party,
ICELAND
MONITOR
(Apr.
6,
2016),
https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/politics_and_society/2016/04/06/almost_half_of_icelandic
_nation_now_want_the_pirate/.
338

See,
e.g.,
What
is
Copyleft?,
https://www.gnu.org/licenses/copyleft.html.

GNU

(Dec.

15,

2018),

339 See, e.g., Mike Masnick, MPAA To USTR: More Shutdowns Like Megaupload, Please,
TECHDIRT (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121205/16451021247/mpaa-toustr-more-shutdowns-like-megaupload-please.shtml.
340 Blunt et al., supra note 319, at 21. See also Kendra Albert, Enough About FOSTA's
'Unintended Consequences'; They were Always Intended, TECHDIRT (July 29, 2021),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210728/13245147264/enough-about-fostas-unintendedconsequences-they-were-always-intended.shtml#fn:7.
341 Blunt et al., supra note 319, at 72 (“The paradox of the seemingly unyielding surveillance
and censorship of digital technologies coupled with our growing reliance on these technologies
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the effects of SESTA-FOSTA were slight. Intermediaries know that, so long as they
aggressively moderate sex workers, they can still rely on a comprehensive system of
intermediary liability. Similarly, there are actors who do not (or cannot) comply with
the DMCA and are liable under theories of online secondary contributory liability.342
In general, those actors tend to be relatively active and knowing facilitators of
copyright infringement.343 This is not to say that law has coalesced in a perfectly
coherent or reliable way, but that the DMCA has created a relatively stable regime
where actors can choose to be within or without it, and the secondary liability within
the DMCA is relatively easy to avoid,344 while secondary liability outside it is much
less certain. Indeed, the effects of the MegaUpload and associated actions were
probably greater on the general public, perhaps in part because Section 230 is a more
comprehensive and stable backdrop than the DMCA and in part because of the
prevalence of pirating as compared to sex work.345
But that does not mean that Section 230 can be infinitely narrowed: the more
carveouts, and the broader those carveouts are, the less comprehensive and stable the
overall regime will be. And just as importantly, reformers and policymakers need to
think very carefully about which subsets of the internet, if any, we want to subject to
the type of effects catalogued above: crude banning and mass filtering of wide ranges
of content. Furthermore, we might also see a return to the paywalls of the early internet
and a move away from user-generated online content to professional content that
online intermediaries have more control over.346
C.

The Elephant in the Room: The Rest of the World

The obvious riposte is that we are the only country with Section 230-type
intermediary liability immunity, and the rest of the world is getting along just fine
without it. As a preliminary manner, it is not clear that the rest of the world is getting
along just fine without it, as intermediary liability is increasingly used by authoritarian
has brought about another example of sex workers and [activists, organizers, and protesters],
serving as canaries in the coal mine—suffering the extent of these restrictions before they are
noticed by the general public.”).
342 See, e.g., MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 926–27 (2005) (finding that
Grokster did not suspend users or prevent them from sharing content and StreamCast, another
plaintiff, actively prevented monitoring of copyrighted materials); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa, 494
F.3d 788, 795 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that Visa is ineligible for the DMCA’s safe harbor
because it is not an “Online Service Provider”).
343 See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 926–27.
344 Lerner, supra note 276, at 360–61 (finding that the law established by Viacom and UMG
remains undisturbed, but that there are still unsettled questions).
345 See, e.g., Rosa Escandon, Film Piracy has been Skyrocketing as People Stay Home,
FORBES (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rosaescandon/2020/04/27/film-piracyhas-been-skyrocketing-as-people-stay-home/?sh=416f1dd87c81; Britney Fitzgerald, Software
Piracy: Study Claims 57 Percent of the World Pirates Software, HUFFPOST (June 1, 2012),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/software-piracy-study-bsa_n_1563006. Contra FAQs & Sex
Information, KINSEY INST., https://kinseyinstitute.org/research/faq.php (last visited Oct. 24,
2021) (finding that, as of 2006, about 15% of men had paid for sex—down from 69% in 1945).
346 Goldman & Miers, supra note 147, at 214–15.
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nations as a tool of speech control.347 But critics are usually conflating stable
democracies (our supposed counterparts) with “the rest of the world.” 348 Looking at
other common law countries, with whom the United States shares cultural, linguistic,
political, and jurisprudential similarities (to a point), we can draw two conclusions.
First, the application of common law principles has yielded, similar to SESTAFOSTA and online secondary copyright, unclear liability standards. Second, we
should take the effects of legal uncertainty (or the lack thereof) in other common law
countries with healthy skepticism given differences between our political and
jurisprudential systems and existing evidence, discussed above, of the effects of legal
uncertainty in our system.
1.

The Common Law Approach

We can ask the same questions of comprehensive liability systems as we can of
common law systems: (1) what is the scope of the liability rules, (2) what does
compliance looks like, and (3) what are the consequences of not following them? In
the common law context, the answers are far from clear.
The scope of liability is roughly consistent under a common law system (which,
absent a statute, should apply to all causes of liability—defamation, negligence, civil
rights claims, etc.). Other common law countries applying common law principles
have considered the stack in developing liability doctrine and have mostly held that
social media platforms and other similar intermediaries are distributors, not
publishers. There is a general sense that “the less implicated an intermediary is in
creating, editing or approving content, the less likely it is to be treated as a
publisher.”349 As such, most intermediaries are generally liable upon notice and
failure to remove.350 For instance, in Canada, the application of defamation law to
platforms and similar actors is, in practice, an NTD regime where the relevant analysis
is knowledge and control of the unlawful content.351 However, common law countries
have yet to resolve whether search engines are liable upon notice, and the rules that
have developed are inconsistently applied.352 In contrast, ISPs have generally been

347 See, e.g., Udbhav Tiwari, India’s New Intermediary Liability and Digital Media
Regulations Will Harm the Open Internet, OPEN POL’Y & ADVOC. (Mar. 2, 2021),
https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/2021/03/02/indias-new-intermediary-liability-and-digitalmedia-regulations-will-harm-the-open-internet/.
348 Edelman, supra note 11 (arguing that Canada has gotten along fine without broad
intermediary immunity).
349 Emily Laidlaw, Notice-and-Notice-Plus: A Canadian Perspective Beyond the Liability
and Immunity Divide, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY, 447
(Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020).
350 Id. at 447 nn.19–20 (collecting cases).
351 Emily Laidlaw, Mapping Current and Emerging Models of Intermediary Liability, SSRN,
16–17 (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3574727.; accord Vivek
Krishnamurthy et al., CDA 230 Goes North American? Examining the Impacts of the USMCA’s
Intermediary Liability Provisions in Canada and the United States, SSRN, 10–11 (2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3645462 (collecting cases).
352 Laidlaw, supra note 349, at 448 nn.22–26 (collecting cases).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

59

260

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[70:201

held not liable even with notice.353 But it is less clear how actors like Cloudflare or
AWS or App Stores fit into this common law scheme. Nonetheless, if you are a
relatively active intermediary, you will know that you operate under a notice regime.
In the absence of a statutory scheme that defines notice, 354 whether notice is
sufficient is left up to the courts. For instance, in C.G. v. Facebook Ireland Ltd.,355 the
Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland found that actual knowledge of “misuse of private
information” could not be supplied by a trial concerning related facts but a different
legal theory,356 nor by various letters complaining of defamation and misuse of private
information.357 However, a letter that contained facts showed the information was
private was enough.358 The substantive requirements for intermediaries are not clear:
that the information is “private” is a necessary element of the tort, but it is not the only
one. How does an intermediary know which elements of which torts are necessary to
communicate notice? This becomes especially difficult when dealing with contextual
elements, like whether a statement is defamatory.359 Furthermore, the Court held that
an intermediary cannot impose their own notice structures on the law—Facebook
could not blind itself to notice received outside its complaint procedures.360 That
means, functionally, there are no procedural requirements at the common law: “Actual
knowledge is sufficient however acquired.”361
Finally, remedies vary widely, but there does seem to be more willingness in other
common law countries to enjoin innocent third parties 362 than at least in the federal
courts of the United States.363

353 Id. at 447 n.18 (collecting cases); cf. Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 35 N.Y.2d 746, 750–51
(1974) (describing a similar “conduit” liability at common law for actors like telephone
companies).
354 It is not true that there are no statutory schemes: the U.K., for instance, has a unique NTD
system for defamation where the website only needs to take down content where the plaintiff
proves it cannot sue the defendant directly. Defamation Act, (2013) cl. 26 § 5,
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/section/5/enacted.
355
CG
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.
http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NICA/2016/54.html.

&

Anor

[2019]

NI

21.

356 Id. at ¶ 63.
357 Id. at ¶ 64–71.
358 Id. at ¶ 71–72.
359 Cf. Keller, supra note 65 (discussing the contextuality of defamation law in the U.S.).
360 CG v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. [2016] E.M.L.R. 12, 58 (Ir.).
361 Id.
362 See, e.g., Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., [2017] S.C.R. 824, 826–27 (Can.)
(explaining the standard for interlocutory appeals in Canada asks, “is there a serious issue to be
tried,” the plaintiff is “suffer[ing] irreparable harm,” and “the balance of convenience is in
favour of granting the interlocutory injunction” (citing RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 (Can.))).
363 See, e.g., Blockowicz v. Williams, 675 F. Supp. 2d 912, 913–16 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (holding
that under federal law injunctions only apply to “aiders and abettors” that are “acting in concert
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The Effects of the Common Law Approach

The effects of the common law approach are difficult to gauge in any systemic
way, but we can make some educated guesses that personhood claims, especially
legally cognizable ones, will be privileged in this system. What that means, however,
is difficult to extrapolate because of the jurisprudential and political differences
between the United States and most common law countries.
The “moderator’s dilemma” does not plague common law countries because they
have largely not followed Stratton Oakmont; instead, intermediaries are only liable
upon notice, functionally a common law NTD system. Therefore, liability shapes
content moderation systems in common law countries the way that was predicted in
Zeran: intermediaries take down content that they think is unlawful or that is alleged
to be unlawful by its users.
However, there is a paucity of empirical research, likely because the standards are
so inconsistently applied and because of the lack of procedural requirements in notice
standards: if there is no limit on the way intermediaries can receive notice, notice
becomes functionally impossible to measure. This is exacerbated by intermediaries’
use of community guidelines; we do not know whether intermediaries took down
speech because it was feared to be unlawful or because it was bad for business. The
only experimental evidence available is an experiment that found U.K. intermediaries
were willing to take down John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, though that study seems to
no longer be available.364
This system should generally privilege personhood claims. Because there is no
standardized system of notice, the only cost someone with a personhood claim has is
the cost of communicating their complaint to the intermediary. Once that complaint is
received, there is little countervailing legal incentive to keep the speech up. However,
this comes with the caveat that if the market and cultural incentives weigh against the
personhood claimant and the intermediary keeps the content up, they have no
alternative but to institute a costly and time-consuming lawsuit.365 This is somewhat
supported by the push among common law countries to adopt filters and more specific
duties in response to a perceived lack of action among intermediaries.366
From a process frame, this system is sorely lacking. Those with speech claims are
not parties to the dispute; as non-parties, they lack any notice or participation. And
or legally identified . . . with the enjoined party” and that without some sort of direct contact
between the intermediary and the poster of the unlawful content, that standard is not met).
364 See Daphne Keller, Empirical Evidence of “Over-Removal” by Internet Companies
Under Intermediary Liability Laws, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (May 8, 2020) (describing the
Oxford Program in Comparative Media Law and Policy’s experiment).
365 See, e.g., Bar-Ziv & Elkin-Koren, supra note 240, at 375 (finding that lawsuits have
decreased as notices have increased, suggesting the NTD process has functionally replaced
lawsuits); Urban et al., supra note 207, at 114–15 (pointing out that NTD is a more efficient
process for rightsholders than lawsuits); Seng, supra note 228, at 376 (describing NTD as a
“fast and efficient” process).
366 See, e.g., Oliver Dowden & Priti Patel, Online Harms White Paper: Full Government
Response to the Consultation, HM GOV’T (2020); see generally Online Hate Speech,
Exploitation and Harassment Online, LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA (2019),
https://www2.liberal.ca/our-platform/online-hate-speech-exploitation-and-harassment-online/.
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those with personhood claims fare little better: after communicating with the
intermediary, they have no right to participate in the adjudication of their claim. And
neither party has access to an impartial arbiter. As discussed above, the intermediary
has legal incentives to take the content down, but it may also have profit incentives to
keep the content up. Both claimants are essentially at the mercy of the intermediary’s
internal calculus of those incentives. Any process they do offer, as under Section 230,
will be completely due to market and cultural incentives—indeed, giving process to
users is probably legally disincentivized as it will make it impossible for the
intermediary to disclaim notice of the content in question.
Also, most other common law countries have very different political and legal
systems. Canada, New Zealand, Australia,367 to a lesser extent the U.K.,368 and not
Hong Kong,369 all score highly on several measurements of freedom of speech and
civil rights generally and significantly higher than the United States. 370 Those
countries also have a different underlying substantive law, including personhood
claims like hate speech laws not available in the United States.371 And there is some
research showing that the enforcement of certain personhood claims may be correlated
with an increase in expression372 and civic engagement.373 If I am correct that in the
United States those extralegal personhood claims are better protected by Section 230

367 Democracy Index 2020: In Sickness and in Health?, ECONOMIST INTEL. UNIT, 8–9 (2021)
(listing New Zealand as the 4th healthiest democracy in the world, Canada as the 5th, and
Australia as the 9th); World Press Freedom Index, REP. WITHOUT BORDERS,
https://rsf.org/en/ranking# (last visited May 3, 2021) (finding New Zealand as having the 8th
best environment for the press, Canada the 14th, and Australia the 25th).
368 Democracy Index 2020: In Sickness and in Health?, supra note 367, at 9 (listing the U.K.
as the 16th healthiest democracy in the world); World Press Freedom Index, supra note 367
(listing the U.K. as the 33rd best country for the press).
369 Democracy Index 2020: In Sickness and in Health?, supra note 367, at 11 (listing Hong
Kong as 87th on its democracy index and characterizing it as a “hybrid regime”); World Press
Freedom Index, supra note 367 (listing Hong Kong as the 80th best country for the press).
370 Democracy Index 2020: In Sickness and in Health?, supra note 367, at 9 (listing the
United States as 25th on its democracy index and as a “Flawed democracy”); World Press
Freedom Index, supra note 367 (listing the United States as the 44th best country for the press).
371 See, e.g., Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, 319(1) (“Every one who, by
communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against any identifiable group
where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, is guilty of [a criminal
offense].”) (emphasis added).
372 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Jonathon Penney, When Law Frees Us to Speak, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 2317, 2329–32 (2019) (conducting a survey and finding that the reaction to
a cyber-harassment law was that people would express themselves more, especially women).
373 See generally Katherine Gelber & Luke McNamara, The Effects of Civil Hate Speech
Laws: Lessons from Australia, 49 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 (2015) (arguing that empirical evidence
via surveys and review of letters to the editor of major newspapers show hate speech laws
lowered the amount of pejorative language in public discourse, is viewed as putting an important
“floor” on debate and has minimal effects on non-hate speech).
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than legalizing the content moderation system, then mimicking the form of Canada’s
intermediary liability might not lead to the same results.
Furthermore, political differences are a reason to be cautious about using these
countries as our supposed counterparts. It is not clear that the United States, scoring
significantly lower on measures of democracy and free speech than its common law
counterparts, should be using stable democracies as the relevant measuring post.
Instead, we might look to other “flawed democracies” like India or Brazil,374 when
considering what types of laws are appropriate. It may make more sense to leave these
decisions to the cultural and market incentives, at least until our political system
stabilizes. Finally, the discussion above regarding the effects in the United States of
this “common law confusion” shows that the relative lack of harms on their societies
should not be imputed as evidence that our country would fare similarly.
V. SUGGESTIONS
Gilad Edelman has argued that Section 230 defenders were nothing more than
libertarians dragging out tired, silly, anti-regulatory arguments that were disproven in
other areas.375 I hope the preceding analysis complicates that line of argument by
showing how, in the context of the United States, imposing liability could limit the
consideration of extralegal personhood claims like hate speech and misinformation by
intermediaries. That is true whether it comes in the form of a comprehensive
alternative like the DMCA, which forces intermediaries to mimic a legal structure with
which many of us non-libertarians have serious issues or a complete repeal that
imposes legal uncertainties that lead to widespread blocking, even more automated
processing, and shutdowns of sites that operate on the boundaries of what is legally
acceptable—affecting groups that have been pushed to those boundaries by our legal
system. But there are also alternative systems of regulation that might address
commonly discussed harms without the worst drawbacks. These include creating a
regime of systemic compliance that takes the best parts of the NetzDG law or creating
narrow exceptions that exist in the shadow Section 230. These solutions all come with
their own drawbacks but are more narrowly tailored to deal with the problems that
Section 230 reformers claim to want to solve.
A.

Systemic Compliance

One of the understudied aspects of liability is the scope and type of remedies. We
should not limit ourselves to common law damages in thinking about alternative
regulatory systems. One such system, for all its faults, is the system created by

374 Democracy Index 2020: In Sickness and in Health?, supra note 367, at 10.
375 Edelman, supra note 11. A crucial difference, discussed throughout this paper, is that the
negative externality being regulated and the harms both involve human rights; this is not an
issue where a defective tractor harms someone and it makes sense to force the producer to bear
the cost (and thus spread the cost evenly among all consumers of tractors), but one where
increasing the liability of the producer affects the human rights of both the speakers and the
listeners in complicated ways. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999) (discussing similar complications in
regulating money and speech in politics).
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Germany’s “Network Enforcement Act” (NetzDG),376 which punishes systemic noncompliance without leveling a fine for each individual content moderation mistake.
Although such a system raises concerns about abuse, it could be a middle ground that
pushes intermediaries to address more unlawful content, punishes intermediaries who
simply operate outside the law, but does not legalize the content moderation system.
Such a system could be primarily focused on transparency rather than substantive law,
especially in the United States.
If the real question in content moderation is the number of “mistakes” (however
we define that) we are willing to tolerate, then the question for remedies should be
how to incentivize that level. The classic theory of intermediary liability, for instance,
argues that treating most online intermediaries as speakers for the purposes of
liabilities incentivizes them to err against borderline speech, and immunizing
intermediaries levels the playing field. I have argued that, in the United States,
immunizing intermediaries delegalizes content moderation systems, allowing political
currents that have been shut down by First Amendment jurisprudence to reassert
themselves as cultural and economic incentives.
But just as we should look beyond the stay-up and take-down binary in content
moderation, we should expand our understanding of possible remedies in looking for
the correct balance. First, we could consider assigning remedies depending on the type
of actor—the further down the “stack,” the less punitive the remedy, replacing
damages with injunctions.377 Second, as douek has pointed out, “a punitive approach
to regulation that punishes content moderation systems for individual errors is
unrealistic and creates bad incentive problems.”378 If what we are looking for is not
100% compliance, but substantial compliance, then perhaps what we should be
penalizing is insubstantial compliance rather than individual instances of failure.379
This would have two salutary effects. First, it mitigates issues of biasing
intermediaries’ adjudications toward legally cognizable personhood claimants by
ensuring only systemic non-compliance is being punished. Second, it prevents
legalizing the content moderation systems, which in turn risks blunting the impact of
market and cultural incentives to moderate lawful but awful speech.

376 Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], June 30, 2017,
Federal Law Gazette I 3352 (Ger.).
377 See generally Martin Husovec, Remedies First, Liability Second: Or Why We Fail to
Agree on Optimal Design of Intermediary Liability, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ONLINE
INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY, 90 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020); Id. at 91–94. Even so, injunctions
can be quite expensive insofar as litigation can be more expensive than damages.
378 douek, supra note 130, at 827.
379 It is not clear that is what everyone is looking for. Mike Masnick, Senator Endorses
Destroying
Computers
of
Downloaders,
TECHDIRT
(June
17,
2003),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20030617/1445203.shtml; Evan Hansen and Lisa Bowman,
Court: Napster Filters Must be Foolproof, CNET NEWS (July 12, 2001),
http://news.cnet.com/Court-Napster-filters-must-be-foolproof/
2100-1023_3-269837.html
(“‘There should be no copyright infringement, period,’ [Judge] Patel said. When Napster
attorneys asked Patel for a standard that would allow them to go back online, [Judge] Patel
replied, ‘[T]he standard is to get it down to zero, do you understand that?’”).
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For example, although it is commonly referred to as a “intermediary liability” law,
NetzDG actually creates a regulatory compliance system.380 NetzDG requires certain
online intermediaries to act on certain kinds of unlawful content when reported by a
user in a specific timeframe, requires intermediaries to create reporting tools for users,
and requires intermediaries to issue reports of their actions biannually.381 In the wake
of its passage, free expression groups objected to NetzDG’s quick timeframes, 382 and
there were almost immediately anecdotal reports of the NetzDG leading to takedowns
of lawful speech, most prominently a far-right politician and a satire website.383 But
intermediaries’ disclosure reports tell a different story: the vast majority of flagged
content is taken down under the sites’ community guidelines, suggesting the law has
a limited impact.384 It might be that the intermediaries take German-flagged content
more seriously and apply their community standards more aggressively or that they
have expanded their terms of service to ensure boundary content gets taken down.
Without knowing the rates of removal against non-German flagging, we do not
know.385 Intermediaries hiring of German-language legal teams suggests they do take
this law seriously, as a general matter.386
But if NetzDG does have a relatively small impact on lawful speech, it might be
because NetzDG only punishes intermediaries for systemic non-compliance.387 How
many incorrect decisions a platform must make is unclear, but there seems to be a twotier system where some mistakes result in a lower fine but consistent mistakes can
result in a determination that the system is functionally not being implemented at
380 To be fair, it interacts with the intermediary liability regime because Germany, consistent
with the e-Commerce Directive, has a general notice system for all unlawful online content.
Sandra Schmitz-Berndt & Christian M. Berndt, The German Act on Improving Law
Enforcement on Social Networks: A Blunt Sword?, SSRN, 8 (2019). Therefore, any user-flagged
content via the NetzDG flagging system will also render the intermediary liable via notice
liability.
381 Id. at 18–19, 21–22, 25, 30.
382 See, e.g., Germany: Flawed Social Media Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 14, 2018)
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law#; Germany: Act to
Improve Enforcement of the Law on Social Networks Undermines Free Expression, Article 19
(Sept. 1, 2017) https://www.article19.org/resources/germany-act-to-improve-enforcement-ofthe-law-on-social-networks-undermines-free-expression/; Emma Llansó, German Proposal
Threatens Censorship on Wide Array of Online Services, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH.
(Apr. 7, 2017) https://cdt.org/insights/german-proposal-threatens-censorship-on-wide-array-ofonline-services/.
383 Germany is Silencing ‘Hate Speech’, but Cannot Define it, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 13,
2018) https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/01/13/germany-is-silencing-hate-speech-butcannot-define-it.
384

Removals
Under
the
Network
Enforcement
https://transparencyreport.google.com/netzdg/youtube?hl=en.

Law,

GOOGLE,

385 YouTube, for instance, only reports the “numerator” of how many instances of content it
removes, not the “denominator” of flagging requests. Id.
386 Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 380, at 32.
387 Id. at 19.
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all.388 For instance, Facebook was fined 2 million euros for “hiding” the reporting tool
required by the NetzDG ,389 leading it to report less than a thousand notices in the first
year, whereas Twitter and YouTube reported hundreds of thousands of notices. 390
That is not to say there are no problems with NetzDG, 391 and it does still somewhat
legalize the content moderation system, requiring a centralized, top-down system and
a focus on legally cognizable harms.
Another approach that would help to maintain the delegalized content moderation
world would be to define compliance in terms of transparency and possibly actually
enforcing one’s own rules, facilitating the conversation between advocacy groups and
the intermediaries. This could be via much-needed transparency reforms, such as
requiring intermediaries of a certain size to submit to independent auditing, even of a
non-governmental organization,392 generating anonymized data for researchers
(instead of blocking them),393 retaining certain content that was taken down in “poison
cabinets,”394 etc. Such an approach would prevent intermediaries from announcing
rules and then not enforcing them without penalizing them for each violation, but for
substantial non-compliance. That would hopefully avoid the trap of the DMCA, which
imposes adjudication process requirements that incentivize avoiding the process
altogether.
And yet, there is a large caveat: the problem of jawboning. As discussed above, it
is not clear the United States has a sufficiently strong rule of law to justify a
compliance regime that might be abused. Just because NetzDG has not been used to
silence political critics of the German regime does not mean that a similar system
would be free of abuse in the United States.
B.

Narrow Confusion

Alternatively, tort liability might not be so bad if it is thoughtfully focused. The
confusion discussed might be appropriate if we do not mind intermediaries reacting
388 Id. at 19–20.
389 Hadas Gold, Germany Fines Facebook for Under-Reporting Illegal Content, CNN (July
2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/02/tech/facebook-germany-illegal-content/index.html.
390 Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 380, at 31–35.
391 For instance, it offers speakers no opportunity to appeal or contest the decision. Id. at 25.
392 See, e.g., Langvardt, supra note 105, at 301; cf. Tara Wright, The Platform Transparency
and Accountability Act: New Legislation Addresses Platform Data Secrecy, STANFORD CYBER
POLICY CENTER (Dec. 9, 2021) (among other things, mandating access to platform data for
affiliated researchers whose projects are approved by the National Science Foundation and
giving authority to the FTC to require certain types of disclosure)
https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/news/platform-transparency-and-accountability-act-newlegislation-addresses-platform-data-secrecy.
393 James Vincent, Facebook Bans Academics Who Researched Ad Transparency and
Misinformation
on
Facebook,
THE
VERGE
(Aug.
4,
2021),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/4/22609020/facebook-bans-academic-researchers-adtransparency-misinformation-nyu-ad-observatory-plug-in.
394 John Bowers et al., Digital Platforms Need Poison Cabinets, SLATE (Aug. 24, 2021),
https://slate.com/technology/2021/08/social-media-content-moderation-giftschrank.html.
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the way we know they will: extensive ex ante automated moderation by intermediaries
that can afford it, blunt blocking mechanisms or shutdowns from those who cannot. If
we can narrow the scope—both in terms of actors and substance—we might not mind
subjecting intermediaries to them. Contemporary proposals fall short of those
standards.
To the scope, reformers should think carefully about the actors subjected to the
carveout and match them with the problem. If the concern is user safety on dating
apps, then we should limit liability to intermediaries that track your physical location
and whose primary purpose is to connect you with other users offline.395 If the concern
is that intermediaries are profiting off unlawful activity, then limit liability to for-profit
intermediaries.396 And if the concern is that large, centralized intermediaries should
use their resources to better moderate unlawful content, then limit liability to large,
centralized intermediaries using parameters that are judicially noticeable so that the
scope is clear before litigation begins.397 Furthermore, just as legalizing the content
moderation system can lead intermediaries to mimicking the legal system in their
private adjudications, creating regulation for specific entities but applying them to the
entire internet might create an internet consisting only of those entities. 398
The substantive scope also needs to be carefully considered in light of these issues.
For example, the SAFE TECH Act’s399 change of the material contribution standard
seems to be inspired by a proposition by Public Knowledge, a tech policy advocacy
group, that advertisements should be exempted from Section 230 immunity.400 If a

395 Contra Goldberg, supra note 154.
396 See, e.g., Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 380, at 16–17 (examining how NetzDG’s
scope is limited, among other things, to for-profit sites).
397 See, e.g., Mike Masnick, PACT Act Is Back: Bipartisan Section 230 ‘Reform’ Bill
Remains
Mistargeted
And
Destructive,
TECHDIRT
(Mar.
17,
2021),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210317/12015646438/pact-act-is-back-bipartisan-section230-reform-bill-remains-mistargeted-destructive.shtml (arguing, among, that the proposed bill
uses a “unique monthly visitors” metric for determining the scope despite there being no
agreement on what that means); see also Eric Goldman & Jess Miers, Regulating Internet
Services
by
Size,
COMPETITION
POL’Y
INT’L
(May
25,
2021),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/regulating-internet-services-by-size/.
398 Mike Masnick, The Internet is Not Just Facebook, Google, and Twitter: Creating Other
Things a ‘Test Suite’ For Your Great Idea to Regulate the Internet, TECHDIRT (Mar. 18, 2021),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210317/23530146442/internet-is-not-just-facebookgoogle-twitter-creating-test-suite-your-great-idea-to-regulate-internet.shtml (responding to
Daphne Keller’s initial test suite of with a substantially larger list).
399 Warner, Hirono, Klobuchar Announce the SAFE TECH Act to Reform Section 230,
MARK.
R.
WARNER
(Feb.
5,
2021),
https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/2/warner-hirono-klobuchar-announcethe-safe-tech-act-to-reform-section-230 (proposing to change the “material contribution”
standard to make intermediaries liable if “the provider or user has accepted payment to make
the speech available, in whole or in part”); S., 117th Cong. § 1(A)(iii) (2020).
400 Bertram Lee, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Section 230 and Civil Rights, PUB.
KNOWLEDGE BLOG (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/where-the-rubbermeets-the-road-section-230-and-civil-rights/; see also Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (And
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standard could be defined narrowly—for example, by defining “advertising” with
some degree of specificity, only applying to intermediaries with a certain amount of
revenue or for-profit intermediaries, or by exempting certain types of intermediaries,
401 etc.—the effects might be acceptable. Under such a system, affected intermediaries
would assume they are being held to a negligence standard with regard to the content
of the ads they host. Accordingly, they would filter them, block certain types of
content, and aggressively manually review ads with an eye toward legally cognizable
personhood claims. That type of treatment might be okay as applied to certain types
of advertisers.
Despite worrying developments,402 commercial speech is generally given less
First Amendment protection—to return to the earlier discussion, the gap between our
collective consensus and what we are allowed to legislate on is arguably narrower in
this context. That is, there should be fewer extralegal personhood harms in this context
that we care about but on which we are unable to legislate. Furthermore, we might
think that commercial speakers will generally refrain from hate speech and other
extralegal harms.403 And, consistent with our constitutional theory of commercial
speech,404 we generally are not concerned with the commercial speaker’s speech
claims as much as the positive externalities of those claims. Which is all to say, we
might not mind if advertisers are subject to this type of blunt review—especially given
the salience of civil rights laws in housing and employment ads. 405 And reformers

Not Regulate) Social Media, 1 J. OF FREE SPEECH L. 71, 94–96 (2021) (arguing that
intermediaries should face distributor liability for advertisements); John Bergmayer, It Doesn’t
Make Sense To Treat Ads the Same as User Generated Content, TECH DIRT: TECH POL’Y
GREENHOUSE (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200810/14584745084/itdoesnt-make-sense-to-treat-ads-same-as-user-generated-content.shtml (making a similar
argument).
401 S. 797, 117th Cong. § 5(f) (2021).
402 See supra notes 103–104 (discussing the increasing scrutiny applied in commercial
speech cases).
403 See Szoka, supra note 196 (describing how advertisers largely want nothing to do with
“free speech” platforms—whether that remains the case is yet to be seen).
404 See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 755 (1976) (justifying the First Amendment protection of commercial speech on the
grounds that it allows for the free flow of information to the public, not because of the autonomy
interests of the business owner).
405 Cf. Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, THE KNIGHT FIRST
AMENDMENT
INST.:
EMERGING
THREATS
(Apr.
1,
2018),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data; see also Corin Faife &
Alfred Ng, Credit Card Ads were Targeted by Age, Violating Anti-Discrimination Policy, THE
MARKUP (Apr. 29, 2021), https://themarkup.org/citizen-browser/2021/04/29/credit-card-adswere-targeted-by-age-violating-facebooks-anti-discrimination-policy. But see Brief of Amicus
Curiae Upturn in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Facebook’s Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Complaint, Onuoha v. Facebook, No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53963 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (arguing that when the discrimination is the result of the intermediary’s
tools, Section 230’s current “material contribution” standard should not shield them from
liability).
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should consider combining systemic remedies with carveouts to get the best of both
approaches. That is not to say this is costless; there will be thorny questions around
non-commercial ads and the effects on speech by content creators who are not paid by
the intermediary but are still commercial speakers.406
The problem is in its current form, the SAFE TECH Act arguably applies to the
entire internet,407 from Facebook to Cloudflare and maybe even to ISPs. Even if it
doesn’t, it would create the sort of confusion seen in the context of SESTA-FOSTA
and secondary copyright liability across the entire internet. But even perfect carveouts
are not without risk. The more conditions and carveouts are imposed, the less the
United States intermediary liability system will be a cohesive structure that creates
uniformity and reliability and the more it will resemble a “common law confusion”
model of liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article should not be interpreted as a call to do nothing. Insofar as these fixes
are intended to solve some societal problems,408 there are other options that are far
more effective. In the online context, we can introduce friction. 409 We can enforce
antitrust laws.410 We can ensure more innovation by repealing laws that prevent

406 On the one hand, we might have little sympathy for millionaire influencers. See, e.g.,
Audrey Conklin, Top 5 Highest Paid Social Media Influencers, FOX BUS. (Mar. 9, 2020),
https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/5-highest-paid-social-influencers. On the other, there are
plenty of people whose content creation looks more like a small business—and they are the ones
who are unlikely to be able to cut deals directly with the large intermediaries. See, e.g., Joline
Buscemi, Here's How Much Money These 7 Influencers ACTUALLY Make, And How,
HUFFPOST (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-much-influencersmake_l_5dee68a6e4b05d1e8a556bbc (interviewing a variety of influencers that make less-than
glamorous but more than working-class wages on social media).
407 See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Now it’s the Democrats Turn to Destroy the Open Internet:
Mark Warner’s 230 Reform Bill is a Dumpster Fire of Cluelessness, TECHDIRT (Feb. 5, 2021),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210205/10384946193/now-democrats-turn-to-destroyopen-internet-mark-warners-230-reform-bill-is-dumpster-fire-cluelessness.html;
Aaron
Mackey et al, The SAFE Tech Act Wouldn’t Make the Internet Safer for Users, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/02/safe-tech-act-wouldnt-makeinternet-safer-users.
408 See supra notes 112–13 (arguing, respectively, that privileging defamation claims will
lead to a more truthful, civil public sphere and that privileging harassment claims will lead to a
more inclusive online sphere).
409 See generally Sahar Massachi, How to save our social media by treating it like a city,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Dec.
20,
2021)
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/12/20/1042709/how-to-save-social-media-treat-itlike-a-city/; Ellen P. Goodman, Digital Information Fidelity and Friction, KNIGHT FIRST
AMENDMENT INST.: THE TECH GIANTS, MONOPOLY POWER, AND PUB. DISCOURSE (Feb. 26,
2020), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/digital-fidelity-and-friction.
410 See generally K. Sabeel Rahman & Zephyr Teachout, From Private Bads to Public
Goods: Adapting Public Utility Regulation for Informational Infrastructure, KNIGHT FIRST
AMENDMENT INST.: THE TECH GIANTS, MONOPOLY POWER, AND PUB. DISCOURSE (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/from-private-bads-to-public-goods-adapting-public-utility-
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interoperability,411 or mandate it.412 We can ask for more transparency at a systemic
level so that we can collectively debate intermediaries’ content moderation
policies,413 even if that debate is informal and via civil society rather than legislatures.
And offline, we can enact progressive tax policies on companies with billions of
dollars in revenue,414 and redistribute that wealth in a way that reduces inequality,
rather than attempting to regulate these policies indirectly via a tort system that does
not recognize the harms we are trying to mitigate. Finally, we should keep in mind
that “fixing” our online environments is impossible so long as the online environment
is merely a mirror of our offline world.415
The problem with changing our intermediary liability regime is that those regimes
are primarily concerned with balancing rights claims and, to a lesser extent, providing
process. But our assumptions about which rights or the types of process we are
privileging are probably not correct. This is especially true once we move from a
comprehensive system like Section 230 or the DMCA to a less comprehensive system.
Second, most of our problems are not the rights claims themselves, but what we
assume the effects of privileging a certain type of claim will be. Even if we could be
certain of the type of rights claims or process we were privileging, I hope I have
complicated the assumptions about the necessary connections between those rights
claims and the effects they have in the world.

regulation-for-informational-infrastructure; Ganesh Sitaraman, The National Security Case for
Breaking Up Big Tech, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST.: THE TECH GIANTS, MONOPOLY
POWER, AND PUB. DISCOURSE (Jan. 30, 2020), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the-nationalsecurity-case-for-breaking-up-big-tech.
411 See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Reform, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cfaa (last visited May 3, 2021) (advocating for reforms to the CFFA
to encourage innovation and prevent businesses from using it to punish people who violate
corporate policies).
412 See, e.g., Ethan Zuckerman, The Case for Digital Public Infrastructure, KNIGHT FIRST
AMENDMENT INST.: THE TECH GIANTS, MONOPOLY POWER, AND PUB. DISCOURSE (Jan. 17,
2020), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the-case-for-digital-public-infrastructure; Cory
Doctorow, Adversarial Interoperability, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/10/adversarial-interoperability (collecting pieces on the
“history, theory and practice of adversarial interoperability”).
413 douek, supra note 130, at 821–25.
414 Supra notes 45–46.
415 See, e.g., Alexander Bor & Michael Bang Petersen, The Psychology of Online Political
Hostility: A Comprehensive, Cross-National Test of the Mismatch Hypothesis, AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1 (2021) (using surveys and behavioral experiments, show that, contrary to popular belief,
there is no evidence that people that are unusually hostile online are not hostile offline, instead
finding that people who are hostile online are in fact just as hostile offline; the difference is that
their offline hostility is rarely amplified and goes unseen).
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